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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 WHY MERGERS MATTER? 
Research on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) has been one of the single biggest and diverse 
fields of study in corporate finance for decades – and for a reason. Mergers and acquisitions 
directly influence hundreds of thousands of people every year and restructure entities worth of 
billions of euros in value. 
Vertical mergers have received relatively little attention in the empirical research compared to 
horizontal and conglomerate mergers. There are two reasons for this relative lack of interest. 
On the one hand the public interest has traditionally been on large horizontal mergers because 
their implications are more visible to the consumers. On the other hand vertical mergers tend 
to be more invisible to the public. If a car manufacturer acquirer’s one of its suppliers 
consumers are unlikely to notice where as if a multinational bank takes over a local bank, 
often it is virtually impossible not to notice. However, there is another, more practical, reason 
for seeming lack of interest in empirical research in vertical mergers: the accurate 
classification of mergers has been and still is difficult.  
Traditionally identifying a merger’s type has relied on SIC or NAICS codes but these 
methods have proven unreliable as measure of vertical integration (Fan, Goyal 2006). This is 
because both SIC and NAICS measure the closeness of production process or output rather 
than the material flows between the companies. Consequently, this lack of both accessible and 
reliable merger type data has made it difficult to test already formulated vertical integration 
theories and their implications. In the few empirical studies conducted the researchers have 
had to rely on manual inspection
1
 of each company or industry to determine if a vertical 
relationship exists or could exist. This is often unfeasible if data sets include thousands of 
companies and extend across decades. Furthermore, inspecting actual trading patterns of 
individual companies is limiting if the potential for trade is of interest. This is especially true 
if the industry is not very concentrated and the number of potential trading partners is large. 
Using commodity flow based input-output methodology can overcome some of these 
challenges. It works by tracking the aggregate commodity and intermediate product flows as 
                                                 
1
 For example, Fee and Thomas (2004) identify vertical relations manually based on actual trading relations. 
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they move through the economy. This makes it possible to track and, if necessary, model 
quite complex vertical relationship networks. 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Merger value creation has been extensively studied for decades. However, the questions 
regarding division of that value added between the target and the acquirer and the 
determinants of the division of gains are much less studied. Conventional wisdom and some 
previous studies propagate the notion that it is the target that captures the bulk of the merger 
gains. However, this view is inadequate as in most cases it is based on studies that only 
compare the average cumulative abnormal percentage returns of the acquirers to the 
corresponding average of the targets. It can be argued that because a typical acquirer is 
considerably larger than a typical target, using percentage returns yields misleading results. 
Furthermore, very little focus has been given to other potential causes for division of gains 
other than acquirer vs. target. Common sense suggests that factors such as relative 
competitive position, size difference and trade relations could plausibly be factors influencing 
bargaining power of the players. This thesis seeks to explore how product market relations 
affect the division of gains in vertical mergers. Instead of measuring merger gains based on 
cumulative abnormal percentage returns I measure the total gains in dollar terms. 
1.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis I study 798 mergers, acquisitions and tender offers across 17 European countries 
between 1990 and 2012. First I classify these mergers as backward, forward, horizontal or 
conglomerate mergers using NAICS codes and vertical relationships variables calculated 
using input-output tables. Then using standard event study methodology I calculate the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in a three-day window surrounding the merger 
announcement date and use it to calculate cumulative abnormal euro returns ($CAR) which in 
turn is used to construct a measure of the relative gain between the acquirer and the target 
(Δ$CAR). This variable is then used as the dependent variable in a regression where relative 
supplier importance (RSI) and relative buyer importance (RBI) are used as main explanatory 
variables of interest. RSI and RBI are constructed from the information provided by the Input-
Output tables and they proxy the vertical dependence of the two companies on each other. 
1.4 MOST SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 
Contrary to expectations I fail to find conclusive evidence in support of the notion that 
product market relations affect the division of merger gains. However, as my sample size is 
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considerably smaller than used in studies before there is plausible chance that failure to find 
significant results is due to insufficient sample size. The fact that significance of my 
coefficients are higher in same subsamples where previous studies find significant results 
corroborates with this idea. 
Furthermore, I find that the common notion that target nearly always captures lion’s share of 
the common gains is false. In approximately 40% of the mergers the acquirers capture greater 
share of the dollar gains and in the subsample where both companies have positive returns, 
this figure is 60%. Finally I find that vertical mergers are more prevalent than suggested by 
methodologies identifying vertical mergers based on SIC or NAICS codes. Horizontal and 
vertical mergers make up nearly 90% of the merger in the sample. Using NAICS based 
approach would have not revealed vertical relation in 40% of the cases. 
1.5 CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis contributes to the literature on division of gains in vertical mergers and 
acquisitions – an area relatively little studied. Following the framework of Ahern (2012) the 
focus of the study is in the division of euro measured gains within the European vertical 
mergers during the past two decades. To my knowledge no such attempt has been made using 
European data. Furthermore, my work on classifying European mergers based on input-output 
(I/O) tables and NAICS codes is, as far as I know, unique. Not only I assess the fractions of 
different types of mergers but I also estimate how much better the I/O approach is than the 
traditional SIC/NAICS approach. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The organization of this thesis is as follows: in the second chapter I go briefly through the key 
literature in the M&A research in general and my topic in particular. In the third chapter I 
introduce the research questions of this study and make the connection between the literacy 
review and the research objectives. In the fourth chapter I present in great detail the data and 
methodology used in this study and go through the methodological choices that I had to make. 
In the fifth chapter I present the main findings and analyze the results of the regressions. In 
the sixth and final chapter is the summary of the study and its main findings.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section presents the literature relevant to this thesis. It has two distinct purposes which 
are also reflected in the structure of this review. Firstly, it is intended to provide an overview 
over the broad branch of finance research that focuses on mergers and acquisitions; its key 
questions and findings as well as the key differences of opinion. Secondly, this review seeks 
to provide the methodological and empirical background for understanding the execution of 
the study and interpretation of the results. It will also help the reader to understand the 
challenges and limitations imposed by the methodological choices. 
The sections in this chapter are organized as follows. The first section gives an overall view 
of the various aspects of corporate finance research in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). It is 
followed by sections on merger classification, merger theories and finally empirical studies on 
gains in mergers and division of those gains. 
2.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE MERGERS AND ACQUISITION RESEARCH 
Mergers and acquisitions
2
 research is the single most important and widely studied topic in 
the field of Corporate Finance – and for a good reason. M&As represent the single largest 
monetary transaction of any corporation, often involving major restructuring of one or both of 
the parties adding fair amount of uncertainty to the shareholders and managers alike. Besides 
the shareholders and the management, there is always a wider impact to the society at large in 
terms of employment, competition and strategic ownership. For all these reasons governments 
have a special interest in monitoring and regulating merger activity. Considering all this, it is 
only natural that tremendous interest has been and continues to surround the merger activity 
not only in finance research but also in organizational studies and various related fields. 
Due to the immense volume of research over the past four decades it is impossible to go 
through even all of the most important articles. Despite this I attempt to give a broad 
overview of the most relevant issues in the field. I start this review by classifying the 
questions or research topics in the literature in three broad categories based on the main 
research problem or goal tackled in each category. It is worth noticing that in practice many 
studies could be arguably placed into more than one category and that most studies have some 
                                                 
2
 From now on I shall use words ”mergers” and “M&As” as synonyms  for “mergers and acquisitions” unless 
otherwise specified. 
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elements of all the categories. The classification system does not follow any previous system 
and merely reflects my way of structuring the literature. The categories are listed below and 
they are explained briefly in the following paragraphs. 
1) Descriptive questions 
2) Value creation questions 
3) Explanatory questions 
In the following sections I will briefly go through each of these categories and explain with 
examples what do they in real terms mean. Then at the end of section 2.1 I will also explain 
some of the problems encountered by the researcher when studying mergers. 
 DESCRIPTIVE QUESTIONS 2.1.1
Studies classified as “Descriptive” are best described as investigating what kind of properties 
the mergers have. Questions like “are some industries more prone to mergers than others 
(Mitchell, Mulherin 1996), “are certain types of mergers more common than others” and “do 
mergers cluster in time” (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford 2001) are examples of descriptive 
research questions. Due to the fairly straightforward nature of descriptive studies, most of 
them were conducted early on and in their pure form represent fairly small fraction of the 
contemporary research. However, it is worth pointing out that most of the current finance 
studies all pose and answer some kind of descriptive questions besides their main research 
problem. This way the “descriptive” literature is constantly being updated. 
 VALUE CREATION QUESTIONS 2.1.2
Value creation research focuses on investigating questions regarding the value creation in 
merger activity. The first question that was studied was obviously “do mergers create value”. 
Although at first the question sounds fairly straightforward, it is actually fairly complicated 
one. The most typical approach is to use stock reaction event study – either short-term or 
long-term and try to measure value creation based on it. Neither of the approaches is without 
problems and in the subsequent years a number of studies have used various accounting and 
other real variable based measures in trying to answer the question
3
. 
Over time, majority of the empirical studies found that based on short event window equal-
weighted stock market response indicated that mergers do create value. As the evidence for 
                                                 
3
 For example, see Healy et al. (1992) 
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increased shareholder value started appearing the focus shifted on investigating does the 
observed gains represent true value-added or are they merely a result of redistribution of 
wealth from other stakeholders such as the bondholders (Asquith, Kim 1982), customers 
(Weston, Mitchell & Mulherin 2004, Fee, Thomas 2004) or the government (Neumark, 
Sharpe 1996). Consensus on the issue presently is that observed gains do represent genuine 
value addition, not redistribution. 
When thinking of value creation, from business point of view the most important question is, 
of course, what factors add value to mergers? Why some mergers succeed while others fail 
spectacularly? Can a successful merger be detected ex-ante? These all are questions that are 
not yet satisfactorily answered. A number of different studies have identified factors that are 
associated with increased or decreased returns to either acquirer or the target but general 
theory of merger is still missing. 
Besides questions of value creation there is the derived question of how is the gain divided. 
Common wisdom suggests that it is the target who gains the most; after all, there is a very 
compelling common sense argument for it: the seller is nearly always better informed of its 
value and no rational shareholder is willing to sell their stake below the prevailing market 
price. Furthermore, the mere fact that another company is seeking to buy your company 
reveals that they deem that going market price of the target is attractive compared to their 
private valuation of the target company. Thus it is very unlikely for a target to lose out when 
merger is proposed. Acquirer on the other hand bears downside risk as he is buying something 
of which value he cannot accurately know before buying it. Division of gains research focuses 
on finding out how merger gains are divided between various stakeholders, typically the 
acquirer and the target, and what reasons affect the division of value added. The thesis you are 
reading falls into this category of research. 
 EXPLANATORY RESEARCH 2.1.3
Explanatory research seeks to answer the question why do mergers occur in the first place and 
what motives do companies have when they choose or choose not to merge. This is one of the 
most researched questions in the field and consequently a number of theories and hypothesis 
have been put forward and tested. Most widely discussed theories can be grouped into 3 
categories: 1) value creating theories, 2) value neutral theories and 3) value destroying 
theories. These merger theories and how they could impact the division of gains will be 
discussed later in Section 2.3. 
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 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN MERGER STUDIES 2.1.4
Finance is a field with strong empirical foundations. However, unlike physics or medicine 
finance is a social science and with that comes certain degree of uncontrollability. Research 
cannot be conducted in isolation but is intertwined with the world surrounding us. The quality 
of data is often a big question and availability of relevant data even more. Often research has 
to be conducted with less-than-optimal data. Before we examine the different merger theories 
and their supporting evidence, it is worthwhile to give a little consideration for various 
methodological issues that make corporate finance research challenging. 
Most merger studies use event study methodology
4
. The core assumption of these studies is 
that a merger announcement should yield a stock market reaction on one or more of the 
stakeholders be it the target, acquirer, their customer, competitor or supplier. Implicitly this 
assumes that markets are at least semi-strongly efficient meaning that market participants 
immediately and correctly incorporate all new and relevant data to their valuation of the stock 
and this way the market participants’ future expectations are reflected in the price of the stock 
at announcement. Different hypotheses have different predictions regarding the direction and 
magnitude of the announcement reaction. By studying the reaction in the stock or bond 
markets of different stakeholders we should be able to deduce something about the market-
perceived motives of the mergers, assuming of course that the semi-strong form efficiency 
prevails in the markets. Although in principle simple, this is where the simplicity ends. In this 
study I assume that the stock markets are semi-strongly efficient meaning that any relevant 
new information coming to public knowledge causes a near-instant rational response to the 
stock market price of the companies. 
The definition of a relevant stakeholder is not always so simple and neither is the choice of 
methodology. Obviously the shareholders of the merging companies are relevant stakeholders 
but how about the bondholders, the government or the customers of the companies? 
Numerous environmental organizations such as Green Peace have argued that environmental 
impacts should also be factored in when considering value increase. This is especially 
important if we seek to assess the overall financial impact of mergers to the society at large. 
Different studies have taken different stances. Most often only the stockholders of the 
merging companies are considered but there are studies that explicitly assess the impact to tax 
                                                 
4
 See Section 4.3 for a more detailed explanation of the event study methodology. 
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authorities and bondholders. However, especially when addressing policy questions impact on 
employment and environment might be relevant view points as well. 
Relatively small sounding methodological questions can also be of crucial importance. A 
choice as simple as the weighting of the observations can be crucial in deciding the 
conclusion of the entire study. For example, Moeller (2004) finds that choice of weighting the 
observations between dollar and equally weighted measure can affect the outcome of the 
study. They find that when observations are equally weighted, mergers generate significant 
positive total abnormal returns, however, the result is reversed if dollar weighted abnormal 
returns are used instead. This suggests that large mergers fail more often than smaller ones 
and that the losses of large mergers eat away the gains from small mergers. Despite this 
seeming conflict it is not possible to say that one way is right or wrong. Actually, both 
methods are correct but they merely answer a different question. If one uses percentage 
returns (with equal weighting), one is interested in the returns of a randomly chosen merger. 
This is a relevant question if the investor follows investment strategy of investing fixed 
amount of money into a merger (rather than fixed percentage). If one uses the dollar weighted 
returns, one is interested in the aggregate effects of the mergers. 
Besides the choice of weighting, choice of benchmark index could also play a crucial role as 
suggested in a study by Dimson and Marsh (1986) who investigated the size effect in event 
study methodologies. They find that ignoring company size in choice of benchmark index can 
lead into serious distortions of results, especially with long event windows. The choice of 
time frame for the study is also relevant. The world changes and results can change with it. 
Trends or phenomena that were observed 20 years ago might no longer exist today. For 
example, proliferation of communications technology and computational capacity could 
plausibly have increased market efficiency. Studies testing market efficiency using data from 
the 1960s could have results quite different than those conducted with contemporary data. 
Degree of market efficiency in turn could also impact result of studies that make strong 
assumptions about degree of market efficiency. 
Even though perfect experimental set up probably does not exist, different methods and 
choices, although imperfect, give new insights to problems studied. However, the challenges 
presented above mean that one needs to be careful when interpreting the results of any 
studies. Understanding limitations and possible biases introduced by different methods or 
samples is crucial when trying to generalize the results of a study. In this literacy review I 
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have tried to include sufficient information about the choice of methodology of the referenced 
study if it is unusual among similar studies or if the study is unique. 
2.2 MERGER CLASSIFICATION 
To better understand the whole M&A research it is necessary to understand certain basic 
concepts. One of the most central concepts is the classification of mergers. There are number 
of different ways to do this, such as the acquirer’s attitude (friendly vs. hostile), how merger 
is financed and paid (e.g. levered buy-out, stock swap, cash) and how the offer is made 
(tender vs. negotiation with the management). Each of these classifications have a number of 
interesting studies related to them but for the purposes of this thesis those mentioned above 
are not very relevant. The most relevant classification for my purposes is grouping based on 
the relatedness of economic activities of the merging companies. 
In the following sections I am going to introduce the classification system for relatedness of 
economic activities I am using for this study. The characteristics of each of the different 
merger types are described in their own subsections. I am using modified Weston’s (2004) 
classification scheme as a basis. Following the original scheme, mergers are classified into 
three distinct groups: 1) horizontal mergers, 2) vertical mergers and 3) conglomerate mergers. 
I differ slightly from Weston in exactly how mergers are classified into these groups. 
Differences are explained in the subsequent subsections as they arise. In the next subsection I 
am going to describe horizontal merger and relevant research on it. In the following 
subsections vertical and conglomerate mergers are discussed in similar manner. 
 HORIZONTAL MERGER 2.2.1
In common finance jargon horizontal merger means a merger between companies of similar 
or identical offering and can be thus considered competitors in most cases. While Weston 
uses more specific criteria, for the purposes this study, I classify merger as horizontal if the 
merging companies operate and compete in similar business activities. For example two 
banks merging or two paper-mills merging would be classified as horizontal mergers. Weston 
(2004)  places an additional requirement for the operating region; companies also need to be 
competing for a same geographical market to be classified as a horizontal merger. If the 
companies do not compete in a same market the merger is classified as a subtype of a 
conglomerate merger. While it is easy to see behind this logic, I will not use Weston’s scheme 
due to missing information regarding geographic operations. I use SIC/NAICS codes to 
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identify horizontal mergers and this system or any other information source I use do not 
provide data about the prime operating markets. 
2.2.1.1 HORIZONTAL MERGER HYPOTHESES 
The stated reasons for horizontal mergers are usually economic in nature; economies of scale 
or scope, reduction of overcapacity, elimination of overlapping functions or other efficiency 
gains are often cited. However, critics and regulatory authorities have raised concerns that 
horizontal mergers are be driven by desire to increase market concentration of the industry 
leading to easier collusion among the industry. Since this collusion motive is usually illegal, it 
is rarely mentioned as a reason by the managers. 
What is the reality then?
5
 Why horizontal mergers happen? In the following subsections I will 
first discuss the efficiency hypothesis and then evidence supporting this view and then 
proceed to assess the evidence for collusion hypothesis and discuss a little bit merger 
regulation and its potential impact on the merger activity. 
2.2.1.1.1 Efficiency hypothesis 
General efficiency hypothesis proposes that mergers create synergies that enhance the 
efficiency of the combined entity. In case of horizontal mergers such efficiencies could arise 
from economies of scale, reallocation of production within existing assets, elimination of 
overlapping functions and more efficient sourcing of raw materials (Ilzkovitz, Meiklejohn 
2006). Horizontal mergers can also be used to broaden the product offering when products of 
the industry are differentiable or to enter new markets in case the acquirer lacks presence 
where the target has presence such as a different country or state (Weston, Mitchell & 
Mulherin 2004). 
There is abundance of literature examining the profitability of mergers in general. A 
considerably smaller number focuses specifically on horizontal mergers, however. This is 
partially because investigating a particular type of efficiency using accounting or market data 
might not be very easy. For example, it is possible to examine if the profitability of the 
company has improved but considerably more difficult to say what can attribute for the 
improvement. A considerable number of studies on horizontal mergers approach the issue 
                                                 
5
 Naturally there are other proposed merger motives such as the agency and hubris hypothesis. However, they are 
applicable to other types of mergers as well. They will be discussed in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 respectively. 
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indirectly. Instead of looking for signs of efficiency they look for evidence of alternative 
causes such as increased market power as suggested by the collusion hypothesis. If there is an 
observed increase in profitability and it cannot be attributed to collusion then it is taken as 
evidence for increased efficiency due to economies of scale, technological transfer or any 
other non-collusive reason that might enhance the value of the company. Collusion hypothesis 
and studies on market power as source of merger gains in horizontal mergers are more 
thoroughly discussed in the following section and studies that provide support for the 
efficiency hypothesis are also listed there. 
2.2.1.1.2 Collusion hypothesis 
Are horizontal mergers primarily driven by “legitimate” efficiency reasons or is the sweet talk 
about synergies just smoke and mirrors to cover collusion? A number of studies have 
addressed this question but results have been conflicting. The choice of relevant markets and 
methodology has decisive impact on the outcome. When measuring the market power on vis-
à-vis customers using primarily announcement returns, no evidence of increased market 
power was found (Eckbo 1983, Stillman 1983, Fee, Thomas 2004, Shahrur 2005). However, 
the opposite conclusion was drawn when product prices were studied (Barton, Sherman 1984, 
Borenstein 1990, Prager, Hannan 1998). 
It should be noted, however, that the studies which found evidence for collusion measured 
just the observed price changes in the relevant market and ignored other aspects. While 
observing real prices sounds more convincing measure of market power, in reality it is not 
without complications. Price is not the only variable that companies use when competing. It is 
possible that consumers are benefitting in higher quality of products or better service in spite 
of the price increase. The same could be true to opposite direction: lowered prices might mean 
lower quality of products or worse services. Furthermore, all of the studies listed above have 
focused on a single industry
6
 and only on mere one or two companies within that industry 
which makes generalization difficult. Consequently, drawing strong conclusions from these 
studies on product prices should be avoided. My interpretation of the evidence is that 
horizontal mergers are primarily driven for efficiency reasons rather than seeking of market 
power in vis-à-vis customer market, although both motives along with others are likely to be 
present. 
                                                 
6
 Prager focused on banking industry while Borenstein studied then recently de-regulated airline industry. 
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Although the evidence does not support the view that horizontal mergers are driven by desire 
to acquire market power in against the vis-à-vis customer, it is possible that companies may 
be driven by motives to gain market power relative to their suppliers and corporate customers. 
After all, the regulatory oversight for consumer market companies is likely to be tighter than 
companies having no consumer contact. If this was the case, there should be an adverse 
reaction to the stock prices of the suppliers and corporate customers of the merging 
companies. Two complementary studies have been conducted in the recent decade 
investigating this possibility. 
Following the approach originally suggested by Eckbo (1983), Fee and Thomas (2004) 
examine the valuation impact at the announcement to the merging parties, corporate 
customers and suppliers and post-merger changes in their operating performance. They use 
actual stated customer-supplier relationships identified in FASB No. 14 statements and find 
evidence consistent with synergies and inconsistent with collusion. Merging companies 
experience significant positive stock market reaction while the reaction of customers and 
suppliers is insignificant. However, they do find evidence that market power does play some 
role in sources of gains as evident by temporary changes in operating performance measures 
and the number of supplier experiencing negative response to merger announcement. Similar 
results were found in a subsequent study by Shahrur (2005) which utilized Input-Output 
tables in identifying potential suppliers and customers. In addition Shahrur finds that  
horizontal mergers decrease market power of suppliers when supplier industry is highly 
concentrated. 
As a conclusion to this section on horizontal mergers, it can be said that collusion or desire to 
create abusive market power has not the primary motivation for mergers in the past 30 years. 
For the regulatory authorities this is good news. However, it is impossible to say is this result 
due to regulatory oversight or some other reasons. In any case the recent concerns over the 
collusive mergers seem exaggerated. In the next section I will briefly discuss vertical mergers 
and research on them. 
2.2.1.2 HORIZONTAL MERGER REGULATION 
Horizontal mergers are the most significant type as they have the potential to collusion and 
reduce competition. For this reason, most merger related legislation is directed against 
horizontal mergers. Partially because of this and also because of relative easiness in detecting 
vertical relatedness, horizontal mergers have been the most widely studied type of merger. 
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Regulators use various tools in determining the market power of the merging companies and 
the market structure implications of the combined company. Herfindahl–Hirschman index 
(HH-index) and industry specific concentration ratios, and sometimes even proxy for Lerner 
index, are used to assess anti-competitive potential of a horizontal merger. For example 
concentration ratio of 8 largest firms would tell us the combined market share of the 8 largest 
firms within the 3, 4 or 5 digit NAICS code. However, the concentration ratio can give a 
misleading picture over the prevailing situation: a market with 8 firms commanding 80% 
market share each one having a 10% share is significantly different from market where the 
same 80% is divided so that one company has 70% and the rest share the remaining 10%. 
HH-index measures the market concentration after squaring the shares before summing giving 
largest companies even larger score and thus being able to differentiate in situations where 
concentration ratios fail. 
For interested reader, Neven and Röller (2005) have written an excellent overview on 
contemporary merger control. 
 VERTICAL MERGER 2.2.2
When two or more companies that use the output(s) of the other(s) as their own input merge 
the transaction is classified as vertical merger. Vertical mergers are relatively little studied 
topic in the field despite their considerably large share of all mergers. Depending on exact 
definition and the underlying sample, vertical mergers constitute 30%–40% of all merger 
activity in the US and Europe
7
 (Ahern 2012). 
Reason for this seeming lack of interest in research is that the suitable data have been difficult 
to find and time consuming to process. The problem is basically how to identify a vertical 
merger or vertical relationship. The literature has so far used two basic approaches. First, the 
information can be collected by tracking real supply information from various sources such as 
company financial statements
8
, press releases and interviews. While this approach yields very 
accurate results regarding the true supply relations it is time consuming and prone to 
omissions. The other option is to rely on aggregate data on industry level supply relations. 
                                                 
7
 This estimate is based on aforementioned study and the number of vertical mergers in the sample used for this 
study. The estimate should be considerate as indicative as the methods used are not directly comparable. 
8
 In the US FASB No. 14 requires disclosure of customers and suppliers exceeding certain threshold level in 
company’s financial statements. 
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While this approach is considerably more general and does not necessary reflect true supply 
relationships between specific companies, there are compelling arguments for its quality as a 
good proxy for most applications. The positive side of this approach is the easy availability of 
data and smaller chance of omitting important suppliers and also including potential suppliers 
and customers into the data set. 
Why do vertical mergers take place? The question is closely related to whole question of why 
do companies choose or choose not to integrate and it is primarily studied in the field of 
industrial organization. In the literature most often integration is seen as a development 
towards greater efficiency and/or profitability and more often than not, the proposed 
explanations reflect this view. This is probably because these reasons give intuitively more 
appealing explanation to decision to merge than agency or hubris based explanations. In this 
section I discuss motivations for companies to vertically integrate which in turn explains why 
companies may want to integrate vertically. Do notice that reasons applicable to other merger 
types, such as managerial hubris or agency motives, are discussed more thoroughly in the 
Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 and are therefore left out of this section. 
Value enhancing reasons for vertical integration can be broadly classified into 3 broad 
categories: 1) synergy and efficiency, 2) market failure and imperfection reduction and 3) 
market power. This categorization is my own and is briefly introduced in the following 
sections. 
2.2.2.1 SYNERGY AND EFFICIENCY THEORIES OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
As in case of horizontal mergers, vertical integration raises prospect of direct operational 
efficiencies. Although the source of the efficiencies can be economies of scale, such as 
merging of sales offices or accounting unit, other synergy potential unique to vertical 
companies also exist. In this section I will briefly go through the most important of them as 
suggested by Neven and Röller (2005) and supplemented by my own examples. 
2.2.2.1.1 Economies of scope 
Economies of scope are said to exist if the average unit cost drops as more than one product 
are produced together. This is especially true for services or product-service bundles. Elevator 
and escalator industries are a good example this. Nearly all elevator and escalator makers are 
vertically integrated. Not only they produce to product but also to sell and provide the 
maintenance service to them. Another example could be game console makers integrating into 
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making games for the consoles. For instance, Microsoft sells its X-box on reduced prices but 
recovers the loss in selling games to it. 
2.2.2.1.2 Synergies of physical proximity and technology 
Synergies arising from proximity refer to synergies that are realized when close proximity of 
production facilities reduces costs. This is especially relevant in heavy bulk industries such as 
chemical and steel. For example, steel mill and foundries can enjoy significant cost savings if 
located at the same site due to reduced transportation, energy
9
 and inventory costs. The same 
is true for many chemical industries where residual heat or waste products are used as input in 
a subsequent or other chemical processes. These synergies arise from the physical proximity 
of the production facilities but there are other kinds of synergies present part of which are 
introduced below. 
2.2.2.1.3 Synergies in supply chain management, quality control and R&D 
Synergies in supply chain management, quality control and research and development can 
also be reason for vertical integration. Control of long segments of the supply chain enable 
companies to better manage their inventories and procurement. This does not only help to 
minimize the bullwhip effect
10
 and unwanted oscillation in production but also same raw 
materials used in multiple stages of the production can be purchased at reduced prices. 
Careful planning can also reduce lead times throughout the supply chain. This can be a source 
of considerable competitive advantage in fast paced industries with relatively long lead times, 
such as fashion apparel. Merging of R&D departments of multiple stages of production not 
only save in simple equipment costs but also foster innovation and improve compatibility of 
inputs between various stages of production. 
2.2.2.2 MARKET FAILURE AND IMPERFECTIONS THEORIES OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
In addition to synergies and efficiency explanations, vertical mergers could also be explained 
as a result of market failures and imperfections. An entirely new school of thought emerged in 
the 70s offering to explain vertical integration as a rational response to market and 
                                                 
9
 If steel is delivered to the foundry while it is still molten or hot, foundry need not to use as much energy to re-
melt the steel. 
10
 Bullwhip effect arises when small unpredicted changes in demand in the lower parts of the supply chain cause 
proportionally much larger response in demand in the upper parts of the supply chain because each production 
stage wants to keep progressively larger safety stock. 
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institutional frictions that lower the output of the companies below their theoretical 
maximum. Beginning with Williamson (1971), in this framework integration is seen as a 
corrective organizational response to the market failures and the goal of integration is to 
restore the combined output closer to the level that would prevail in absence of the market 
failure. In this section I introduce two leading theories in the field: the transaction cost 
economics (TCE) and property rights theory (PRT). 
2.2.2.2.1 From Ronald Coase to the transaction cost economics 
The first academic attempt to explain vertical mergers was by Ronald Coase (1937). Coase’s 
focus was not vertical mergers but rather the boundaries of a firm and how contractual costs 
played role in defining those boundaries. In his landmark paper “The Nature of the Firm” 
(Coase 1937) , he asked why firms exist in the first place as opposed to series of small players 
acting with each other through product markets. He went beyond the traditional economies of 
scale argument asking why most industries have multiple sized firms; if the economies of 
scale or scope favor larger units, why do we not observe just one or few companies producing 
everything. His conclusion was that companies face a number of internal and external 
transaction costs which determine the optimum size of the firm. The entrepreneur decides the 
optimal unit size by looking at the relative transaction costs inside and outside the company. 
When the total costs of contracting through markets exceed the total costs of producing 
internally, the company will choose to produce internally as opposed to sourcing externally. 
Coase’s work was carried on by next generation of researchers, such as Oliver E. Williamson 
and Benjamin Klein. They and others picked up where Coase had left and begun to identify 
institutional and structural factors that discouraged companies from operating in the spot 
market. This line of research has become to be known as the “Transaction Cost Economics” 
(TCE). Perhaps the best known work in TCE is Williamson’s book “Markets and Hierarchies” 
(1975). What makes Markets and Hierarchies so special is not only that it is one of the first 
works in TCE but also because it draws from three different fields: microeconomics, 
organizational theory and contract law. 
2.2.2.2.2 Transaction cost economics explained 
The central premise of TCE approach as outlined by Williamson (1971, 1973, 1981) is that 
the real world and real world market participants deviate from the idealized assumptions of 
perfectly competitive markets of microeconomics in several important ways. He identifies a 
set of human and transactional factors that complicates the trading in the spot markets and 
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which incentivize companies to integrate instead. The companies weight these expected costs 
against expected costs arising from producing the good internally such as increased planning 
complexity and managerial overloading. The company will then integrate to the extent when 
the total costs are minimized. 
The classical micro-economic theory makes certain assumptions on free markets and states 
that those who are the most efficient at producing a good will end up producing the good 
whereas those who are less efficient at production will be eliminated as competition 
intensifies. This would suggest that companies will integrate vertically only if they possess a 
competitive advantage such as greater efficiency. However, very few markets are perfectly 
competitive in a way suggested by the theory. In reality various frictions and deviations are 
observed. Barriers to entry, such as government regulation or large initial investments to 
enter, cause some industries to have just a few producers. Railroads are a good example of 
this. Requiring not only huge initial investments to start operations but also are subject to 
extensive government safety regulation. For this reason there are usually only very few 
railroad companies operating in the same area. 
Besides barriers to entry, product differentiability and high transport costs mean that even if 
the industry has large number of competing producers, individual producers can still 
command considerable pricing power due to differing requirements of different buyers. In an 
extreme case customized goods have very little to no value to any other market participant 
except the original customer. To continue the railroad example, imagine a mine in a remote 
area in Alaska with poor access to transport infrastructure. A railroad company could be 
persuaded into building an extension line to the mine and then the ore could be transported 
inexpensively via rail. Once the tracks are laid the railroad would serve only the mine as there 
are no other potential customers nearby.  
The mine example above serves to demonstrate another problematic property of certain real 
world markets. In many industries recovering the initial investment takes years and during 
that time the company earns considerable quasi-rents
11
. In case of the railroad, once the tracks 
                                                 
11
 Quasi-rent refers to the return on an asset that exceeds its opportunity cost in the short-term as a result of 
providing an incentive to make the investment viable in the long-term. For example, an initial investment to a 
relationship specific asset or a patent is an example of a quasi-rent. Economic rent in contrast refers to return that 
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are laid, the rail upkeep costs are fairly low and the railroad is expected to earn large quasi-
rents over the useful life of the rail line to recover the initial investment. It is obvious that the 
railroad company will not invest if the mine chooses to switch to road transportation the next 
year or if the mine will be depleted after few years. However, under the classical economic 
theory both parties should be able to reach a mutually beneficial agreement if both stand to 
gain and negotiating a contract is not too costly. 
Real world humans are very different from the idealized humans of the classical micro-
economic theory. People are mostly reasonably rational but are hindered by memory and 
other cognitive limitations such as absence of unlimited computational capacity. In economics 
this observation is called “bounded rationality” and it has in many cases replaced the 
traditional hyper rationality assumption in economic theory. The practical implication of this 
is that contracting becomes suddenly much costlier as a large number of possible 
contingencies should be prepared for. In theory the participants could write and open contract 
which stipulates that contract will be renegotiated if circumstances change unexpectedly. 
Unfortunately real life is not as simple as besides bounded rationality people also tend to be 
opportunistic. 
Opportunism refers to people’s tendency to try to seize personal gains through lack of honesty 
or “honor” in transactions. This can be either through use of asymmetric information to one’s 
advantage in negotiations or “unfairly”12 taking advantage of circumstances at the time of 
execution or renegotiation of a contract. It is important to notice that an action needs not to be 
illegal to be considered opportunistic; it can be perfectly legal but is often perceived by others 
as unethical. In our railroad example the railroad, once built, becomes a sunk cost. The mine 
would have incentive to try to renegotiate the deal once the railroad has been built and try to 
extract part or all of the quasi-rent earned by the railroad. Or alternatively the railroad could 
try to profit from high commodity prices by trying to renegotiate the transport prices at a later 
date. In brief opportunism means that one cannot trust the opposite party to treat one fairly if 
possibility of taking advantage of one arises. 
                                                                                                                                                        
exceeds assets opportunity cost also in the long-term. Royal monopolies during the age of mercantilism are an 
example of economic rents arising from political decision. 
12
 Although fairness and unfairness are very subjective concepts, in this situation I define unfairness as behavior 
or information that would have prevented the signing of the contract had the other party had prior knowledge of 
the other’s behavior or information. 
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Bounded rationality and opportunism are what Williamson (1973) called “human factors”. 
They make making comprehensive contracts difficult and costly to write. However, they are 
not really a problem when operating in the spot market. If there are plenty of sellers and the 
product sold is homogenous even untrusting parties can engage in trade in the spot-market 
trusting that if the other party tries to take advantage of one, one could always find an 
alternative supplier. Combined with what Williamson called “transactional factors”, the 
“human factors” suddenly become a problem. If the seller or the buyer has market power or is 
somehow able to “hold-up” the other party the situation changes. Then complicated long-term 
contracts or integration is required to make sure that neither party abuses their power. 
One problem with writing long-term contracts is not only information asymmetry on the 
properties of the products or the intentions of the parties and both parties usually recognize 
this. However, the problems do not stop here as in many cases there is information asymmetry 
on information asymmetry. In other words, other party could know more about the degree of 
information asymmetry than the other party. For example, a vast array of information can be 
collected about reserves of a coal mine by extensive and expensive surveying. In many cases 
the mines only do minimal surveys and forgo the extra information. The customer does not 
have any way of knowing if the mine has surveyed its reserves or not. However, the mine 
does. This means that the mine knows more about its coal than any potential customer but it 
also knows how much more it knows. 
In TCE framework integration rises as a response to the problems presented above when long-
term contracting is not possible or when it is prohibitively costly. It is assumed that by 
internalizing the production the incentives of the both companies become aligned and this 
way the frictions that held back production are lifted and gains realized. The central prediction 
of TCE is then that higher quasi-rents and higher information asymmetries lead into greater 
integration within an industry. 
2.2.2.2.3 Empirical evidence for TCE 
Although the assumptions and predictions of TCE are fairly straightforward very little 
empirical evidence exists and most of it is based on case studies. This is probably because the 
nature of data required to test the hypothesis is very much company or case specific and is 
unlikely to exist in larger databases. Despite this the existing evidence supports the 
predictions of TCE quite robustly. 
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Moteverde and Teece (1982) studied the vertical integration within the US automotive 
industry using sourcing and manufacturing data on 133 different components used by Ford 
and General Motors. With advice from a company insider they constructed an “engineering 
effort” rating for each part or component used in a particular car model. This rating is 
constructed so that it proxies the know-how and other immaterial investment of the supplier 
and the customer in the joint-development of the part. Possessing such knowledge is not 
immediately transferable like blue prints or specifications but it is likely to give advantage to 
the supplier who was involved in the development of the part over other potential contractors 
for the part who were uninvolved in the production. This in turn means greater appropriable 
quasi-rents for the contractor and thus greater incentive for vertical integration of the supply 
chain. Using probit regression Moteverde and Teece find that engineering effort is indeed 
significantly and materially related to the degree of vertical integration in Ford’s and General 
Motors’ supply chains even when controlled for other relevant variables. 
Joskow (1985) studied the long-term vertical arrangements of various coal-burning electrical 
generating plants in the United States. According to him, studying coal supply arrangements 
is a good empirical test for predictions of TCE because power generation and coal mining 
have attributes that create potential for hold-ups and appropriable quasi-rents. For example, 
the efficiency of the coal burning unit increases the more specific coal burner it uses and 
consequently the more specific type of coal it consumes. Since the quality and properties of 
coal deposits are not uniform across country and the consistency of deposits within a 
geographical area may vary, once the burner unit is installed the plant is potentially tied to 
one or a few suppliers. The extreme case of this is when the power plant is located at the 
mouth of the coal mine which effectively ties the companies to each other. 
The empirical analysis is based on terms on about two hundred actual contracts between 
mines and power plants of various types. Joskow builds his hypothesis on the transaction cost 
economics approach and he observes that complete spot-market purchases and total vertical 
integration are merely the extremes of a wide continuum of supply arrangements. In between 
there are infinite number of other contractual arrangements that regulate the supply relation. 
Considering the nature of coal markets with its relatively few number of producers and 
barriers of trade due to transportation constraints TCE predicts that spot market should have 
relatively small role and more complex contracts and vertical integration should dominate. 
Joskow’s findings are in agreement with this prediction. Furthermore, inter-regional 
differences in coal quality and transportation capacity seem to explain variation in types of 
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supply arrangement as predicted by TCE. While vertical integration was not very common in 
general, it was very common in case of mine mouth plants, as predicted by TCE. Overall, the 
findings of the study were in line with TCE’s predictions. 
All studies that I could find did provide at least moderate support for the transaction cost 
hypothesis but perhaps more importantly none were inconsistent with it. For an excellent 
overview of empirical tests of transaction cost economics, see Joskow’s (1988) paper on this 
same topic. 
2.2.2.2.4 Property rights theory 
While TCE has clear and understandable theoretical framework and good empirical backing 
and it still fails to answer certain fundamental questions. Why would integration exactly solve 
a problem of hold ups and opportunism as it is equally plausible that such behavior could 
persist between different divisions of a large company? Or which one of the companies is 
more likely to be the acquirer? Property rights theory (PRT) largely evolved from TCE to 
address these concerns. 
First proposed by Grossman and Hart (1986), the PRT shares many of the same assumptions 
as TCE. Both theories explicitly recognize the Williamson’s (1973) and Klein et al.’s (1978) 
assumptions of bounded rationality, opportunism and the inability to write complete contracts. 
They also notice that at times companies develop “relationship specific assets” which over the 
investment’s life-time yield “quasi-rents” that arise from these assets having higher value in 
existing relationship than in any other use outside the relationship. Furthermore, both models 
recognize the presence of information asymmetries; either a one party knows more than the 
other party or then the (managerial or other type) efforts of either or both parties cannot be 
objectively verified by a third party such as a court. 
Where PRT deviates from TCE is that it defines integration much more specifically than 
TCE. Grossman and Hart define ownership in terms of control rights to assets. There are two 
kinds of control rights to assets, specific and residual. Specific rights give the holder the right 
to the aspects explicitly stated in the contract whereas residual rights give rights to aspects not 
excluded by a contract. The control of these residual rights is understood as a definition of 
asset ownership for integration purposes. For example, the legal owner of a car could be a 
leasing company; however, the rights of the leasing company are limited by the leasing 
contract. The lessee has the residual rights to the car. 
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The result of this distinction is that two companies are considered integrated even if they do 
not belong to the same corporate structure as long as the other party has residual control rights 
to the relation specific asset. As an example consider and insurance company. It can sell it 
policies through in-house branch or independent but exclusive brokers who work in a separate 
company. As stated above, in PRT framework the relevant variable to consider is not who 
legally owns a particular entity but to whom does the asset that generates the revenue stream 
belong. In this case the relevant asset is the client list and rights to those clients. If the 
insurance company owns the client list, the broker cannot take those clients with him even if 
the business relationship with the insurance company is terminated. If the broker owns the 
list, the company cannot sell its other products directly to the customer or object if the broker 
takes away the customers in case the relation with the broker terminates. 
The basic model of Grossman and Hart (1986) is that two parties could make a relationship 
specific investment(s) that will generate quasi-rents. However, the performance of the 
investment will partially depend on how the two parties behave after the investment has been 
made. The problem is that before making the investment the two parties cannot write a 
contract to divide the quasi-rents  taking into account all possible contingencies or because the 
behavior of the two parties are not objectively verifiable
13
 to a third party. Simply integrating 
the two companies will not solve the problem because symmetric nature of control; purchase 
of ownership of residual rights by one party will deny them from the other. This merely 
changes the ex-ante the distortions for both parties and does not eliminate them. This 
highlights the fact that principal-agent problems underlie all organizational forms and 
integration does not only bring benefits but also costs. 
How does PRT solve the distortion problem? PRT does not propose solutions as such. It 
merely compares different ownership structures to the theoretical non-distortions case and 
shows what happens if one is chosen over the other. Grossman and Hart state that in case the 
impact of the other company’s ex-ante investment decision to the company’s benefit is 
relatively small compared to the total benefit and this holds true for both companies, then 
non-integration is the most efficient choice. If on the other hand one company’s benefit is 
more sensitive to the ex-ante investment decisions of the other company than vice versa, then 
                                                 
13
 For example, managerial or creative effort. 
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the more sensitive company should own the relevant asset. It is worth noticing that even the 
least distortions solution suggested by PRT does lead into distortions in ex-ante investment. 
To give an example, consider the insurance company example from above (Grossman, Hart 
1986). Suppose that the insurance sales agent needs to devote effort in gaining customers. 
However, how much effort he puts into gaining the customer determines are the customers 
likely to renew their policy next year. If the agent puts in only minimal effort, the customer is 
likely to change broker next year. This, of course is undesirable from the perspective of the 
insurance company who wants to have long-term customers because retaining and old 
customer is much more profitable than acquiring a new one. If the agent is paid a lump sum 
for each new customer, it is obvious that he will put in minimal effort and will only deliver 
temporary customers. To circumvent this, the company needs to back-load the commission so 
that the initial commission is below the minimal effort to acquire a new customer but pay the 
agent a renew commission that is above the agent’s servicing costs for getting the customer to 
renew the policy. 
This back-loading itself does not have any implications for who should own the client list 
unless there are aspects that cannot be contractually agreed before-hand. There are two types 
of aspects that distort the ex-ante investment decision for both parties: a) aspects that hurt the 
company b) aspects that hurt the agent. It is easy to imagine what could be such aspects. The 
company can be hurt if the agent controls the list and decides to switch the customers to 
another insurer just to boost his profit even though the change does not benefit the ultimate 
customer. The agent on the other hand could lose if the company owns the list and makes 
changes to the insurance product that will adversely affect the salability or renewability of the 
insurance policy. The agent cannot switch the customers to a better insurer and thus faces 
losing the customers. 
PRT suggests that the party that is more sensitive to the actions of the other party should own 
the list. This can be demonstrated by comparing two different types of insurance policies of 
which propensity to be renewed has different sensitivities to the actions of the agent. Consider 
life insurance and car insurance policies. Life insurance policies are paid out only when the 
insured dies and are typically not very often switched, at least not because the agent gave bad 
service during the claim processing. The renewal of the car insurances on the other hand is 
more dependent on the quality of continuous service by the insurance agent. In this way the 
car insurance is much more sensitive to the agent’s actions than the life insurance. As noted 
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by Grossman and Hart, this is reflected in differences of ownership of the client list in 
different insurance markets. Life and other insurance insensitive to agent’s continuous efforts 
are typically owned by the insurance companies where as the list is mostly owned by the 
agent in other types of insurance where the continuous customer service of the agent is more 
important. 
The PRT framework presented above is restrictive in a sense that it only considers the 
managerial incentive effects of integration. In reality integration may bring costs and benefits 
other than just the impact on managerial behavior. To overcome this limitation Hart and 
Moore (1990) expanded the analysis by considering cases when asset is being worked by 
several people some of who have and some of who do not have the ownership rights to that 
asset. In addition, they specialize the meaning of residual control rights to deciding who has 
the access to the asset i.e. who can and who cannot use the asset. In their model they analyze 
who should own an asset under various conditions such as when one or more parties can make 
asset specific investment in his human capital while others cannot or when multiple 
complementary assets exists and one or more parties are crucial in utilizing these assets to 
create surplus. While it is redundant to go through their model in any greater detail it is worth 
noting that unlike largely verbal TCE, this PRT model yields mathematically well-defined 
and testable hypothesis then TCE. 
Despite the well-defined PRT model, relatively little empirical examining the relevance of 
PRT has been conducted. Whinston (2003) evaluates the empirical evidence provided by the 
previous empirical studies from TCE perspective and assesses the relevance of those results 
for PRT. He finds that many of the existing studies are not suitable for testing PRT, especially 
cases in which the TCE and the PRT have opposite predictions. For example, consider a case 
where a change in business environment reduces overall quasi-rents but make one party more 
sensitive to the other party’s non-contractible actions. Now TCE predicts that incentive to 
integrate has been reduced while PRT states the opposite. However, testing certain aspects of 
PRT can be even more daunting than testing TCE. For example, PRT assumes that benefits to 
different agents are not independently verifiable by third parties. Finding a natural experiment 
where the benefit is even in theory unobservable possesses considerable challenges to the 
researcher. However, relaxing some of these strong or stringent assumptions might not 
entirely nullify the model while permitting a reasonable natural experiment to be devised. 
Empirical testing of PRT is likely to be a fruitful field for future research. 
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2.2.2.3 COLLUSION HYPOTHESIS 
There is a considerable debate whether vertical mergers are anti-competitive. Traditionally the 
courts in the US have viewed vertical mergers with suspicion on the grounds that an upstream 
or downstream merger could prevent the competitors from accessing either raw materials or 
customers. Starting from the 50s this “foreclosure theory” was adopted as reasoning in many 
leading court cases. If a supplier with monopoly power was acquired by one of its customers, 
the acquirer could then in certain cases gain competitive advantage over its competitors by 
using price discrimination or refusing to sell raw materials (Perry 1989). History has a few 
well-known anecdotes of this happening. During the early days of oil industry, the railroads 
were the only viable way of delivering oil from inland wells in the US mid-west to markets in 
the East and West coasts. Standard Oil Trust was accused of integrating upstream to railroad 
companies and then raising the rail transport prices for its competitors to uncompetitive levels 
(Svanström 1964). However, the extent of this practice, if it happened, and the ultimate 
consequences of it remain anecdotal. Still, it serves as a very understandable example how a 
vertical merger could be anti-competitive. 
The harmfulness of vertical mergers was first seriously questioned in the early 80s when 
Chicago school contested the long-standing view of vertical mergers as anti-competitive. 
However, even before Chicago school, Joseph Spengler (1950) had already presented his case 
for vertical integration under monopoly conditions in multiple stages of production or the case 
of double marginalization
14
. He showed that in certain cases vertical integration will 
necessarily increase total welfare. The evolvement of TCE, PRT and efficiency arguments has 
meant that the academic literature now has much more comprehensive view on the issue than 
before. More recently the Chicago centered view has evolved into a post-Chicago approach 
which combines the economic analysis of the Chicago school with methodology of modern 
industrial organization theory. This has lead into renewed interest in the competitive 
implications of vertical mergers in recent decades. 
Nocke and White (2007) investigate the impact of vertical mergers in the incentives for 
collusion in upstream markets in oligopolistic intermediate goods markets. They find that 
vertical integration creates two opposing effects on the incentives to collude in the upstream: 
                                                 
14
 Double marginalization refers to a case where single product monopoly on both vertical stages exists. Merger 
between the two companies will then result in elimination of the welfare loss associated with applying monopoly 
pricing twice. 
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the “outlets effect” and the “punishment effect”. Outlets effect is created when one of 
upstream producer integrates downstream. Now the integrated downstream buyer will always 
prefer to buy from the integrated upstream company thus reducing the potential outlets of the 
other non-integrated companies and thus profits arising from deviating from the collusive 
agreement. In this way the outlets effect facilitates upstream collusion. The punishment effect 
on the other hand works the opposite way and incentivizing the integrated upstream producer 
into breaking collusion since any profits that the downstream buyers, who benefit from 
deviations from the collusive agreement, are shared with the upstream producer. Thus the 
integrated upstream company is less hurt from the breakup of the collusion than its non-
integrated rivals. The main result of Nocke’s and White’s research is that outlets effect always 
dominates the punishment effect facilitating collusion in the upstream. However, this result is 
valid only for case of the first vertical merger in a non-integrated industry but does not 
necessarily hold if the industries are further integrated. 
In a continuation study Nocke and White (2010) investigate what kind of factors affect the 
size of the impact on collusive schemes. In their model they find that large downstream 
buyers are the most disruptive for competition. This is because the outlets effect grows faster 
than the punishment effect with the size of the merging downstream firm. As a result they 
suggest that the competition authorities should look for big mergers in already thinly 
competed industries without prior integration. 
Chen (2001) argues that besides the impact on incentives if the upstream producer the vertical 
merger will also impact the incentives of a downstream producer and its competitors in 
choosing a supplier. He finds that under fairly general conditions a vertical merger will have, 
like Nocke and White found, two opposing effects: efficiency gain and collusive behavior. 
Which effect is dominant depends on the cost of switching suppliers and downstream product 
differentiation. Vertical mergers tend to benefit consumers when the cost of switching 
supplier is low (i.e. little to no relationship specific assets) or when the downstream product 
market is very differentiated. Customers are worse of when the supply chain has large 
relationship specific assets and the downstream products are close substitutes. 
As seen from cases above, the competitive impact of a vertical merger is far from being 
straightforward as the impact on competition can go either way depending on the specific 
circumstances of the merger. Most of the studies on competitiveness of vertical mergers are, 
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as studies cited above, largely theoretical exercises. There is very little empirical evidence to 
support any of the claims above and is likely to be field for further studies in the future. 
2.2.2.4 OTHER MERGER MOTIVATORS 
In addition to tangible synergies, market failures and collusion, other considerations have 
been proposed for vertical merger motivation. Supply security is a major concern not only to 
states but also to large corporations.  Desire to secure a customer or a supplier is a potential 
reason for vertical mergers often cited in strategy literature. This is can often thought to be 
closely related to reasons put forward in transaction cost economics and property rights 
theory. However, there is a special case to this which takes us outside the corporate world. 
Political analysts’ and commentators have a wide consensus that the main reason for China’s 
aggressive expansion of economic ties to various resource-rich but cash-strapped African 
nations is motivated by desire to secure flow of raw materials to fuel China’s growing 
industry. 
Buckley et al. (2007) find evidence that foreign direct investments of state owned Chinese 
multinational corporations is associated with high levels of political risk and natural resource 
endowments. Furthermore, there is evidence that many FDI projects undertaken by these 
companies are not justified on risk adjusted basis on purely economic grounds. They find this 
consistent with the notion that the behavior of these corporations is consistent with the 
political goals of the Chinese government. Resource security, besides access to foreign 
markets, technology acquisition and fostering foreign policy relationships, are officially stated 
goals of Chinese government (2004). It would be very surprising if the government did not 
use its influence on the state owned enterprises to foster these goals. 
Another other potential merger motivation for a company could be caused by a financial 
distress of a supplier. Suppose that a supplier under financial distress could save money by 
using inferior raw materials or quality control and suppose further that it is difficult or costly 
for the customer to verify the quality of the output in the short-term. For example, a cement 
factory could use inferior quality raw materials in making its products which would cut its 
costs but lower the quality of its output. If the drop in quality cannot be immediately observed 
the customer is not be aware of the inferior quality in the short-term and end ups paying too 
much for its input. Being aware of this, the customer might want to prevent this kind of 
opportunistic behavior, by acquiring the supplier if switching the supplier is not costless. 
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 CONGLOMERATE MERGER 2.2.3
Conglomerate mergers involve two or more companies operating in unrelated business 
activities. As a rule of thumb, a merger is conglomerate if it does not meet the requirements of 
vertical or horizontal mergers. Weston (2004)  recognizes 3 types of conglomerate mergers: 
product extension mergers or concentric mergers, geographic market extension mergers and 
pure conglomerate mergers. Concentric mergers are, according to Weston, companies 
operating in similar business activities but not necessarily compete with each other. For 
instance, a retail bank merging with an insurance company would be an example a concentric 
merger. In a geographic market extension merger the companies involved do not compete in 
any existing geographical area but share a competing product or service. Pure conglomerate 
mergers are those with no operational links whatsoever. In this study only the pure 
conglomerate mergers are classified as conglomerate mergers and the two others are re-
classified as horizontal or vertical mergers. In practice this means that mergers not classified 
as either of the aforementioned classes are assigned to be conglomerate. 
2.2.3.1 MOTIVES FOR CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 
Compared to horizontal mergers, conglomerate merger motives are fairly little studied topic. 
Most of the research has focused on the profitability of such mergers and less thought have 
been given to the merger motives. Due to the lack of obvious economic reasons for pure 
conglomerate mergers, traditional view has been that conglomerate mergers are negative NPV 
projects for the acquirer’s shareholders primarily motivated by agency or managerial hubris 
motives. Managers may desire to diversify their own income stream as the majority of their 
income and benefits or assets (salary, stock option plans, perks etc.) are dependent on the 
value of the company. For various reasons it could be costly or impossible for the manager to 
diversify his income portfolio efficiently, for example because of restrictions on selling 
management stock options. An alternative way for the manager is then to diversify the income 
stream of the company. Diversification of business does not benefit shareholders as they can 
achieve the same outcome more easily (Levy, Sarnat 1970) and without the associated legal 
costs and loss in managerial efficiency. Another important aspect regarding the corporate 
diversification is that if the cash flows to the company become more stable it could constitute 
value transfer from equity holders to bondholders as suggested by the Black and Scholes 
option pricing formula (Black, Myron Scholes 1973). For these reasons it is very likely that 
shareholders can expect to gain very little but stand to lose in corporate diversifications. 
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Other agency motives relevant for conglomerate mergers are managerial entrenchment, free 
cash flow problem and empire-building motives. However, these motives are discussed in 
more depth in the section 2.3.3 Value destroying theories. 
Value creating motives for conglomerate mergers have also been proposed. Managerial 
synergy hypothesis suggests that certain managers or management teams have relative 
advantage in managing multiple firms and this way increase shareholder value. Financial 
synergy hypothesis proposes that larger companies have better access to capital markets and a 
conglomerate merger could create financial synergies as mentioned above (Weston, Mitchell 
& Mulherin 2004). Finally, the market discipline hypothesis (Manne 1965) formulates that 
conglomerate takeovers are motivated by desire to buy firms underperforming due to 
incompetent incumbent management. By acquiring the company and replacing the 
management the acquirer can realize significant gains. In the following paragraphs research 
on some of these theories is briefly discussed. 
2.2.3.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF PROFITABILITY OF CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 
There are various theoretical reasons to suggest that the conglomerate mergers are and were 
driven by agency motives such as diversification (Levy, Sarnat 1970, Amihud, Lev 1981). 
However, also synergetic motives have been put forward as well (Matsusaka 1993). The 
evidence regarding the primary motive for such transaction is unclear. Returns to acquirer’s 
and target’s shareholders have not been shown unambiguously negative or positive. This 
suggests that multiple motives might exist at the same time. 
Examining the mergers announced during the 1960s Amihud and Lev (1981) investigate do 
the firms classified as manager controlled firms engage in different kind of M&A activity 
than the firms classified as owner controlled. They found significant differences in the 
behavior of these two types of companies. The manager controlled firms are more likely to 
engage in conglomerate or diversifying mergers than owner controlled. Furthermore, they 
found a significant link between the managerial control of the company and the R
2
 value of a 
regression matching income/equity ratio of an individual company against the corresponding 
average rate of return of all the companies in the economy. Greater R
2
 value suggests greater 
diversification of the company. To better understand the logic of this, consider an extreme 
case where a company is active in all industries. Then the company’s income would behave 
very much like the aggregate average income of all of these industries. This finding supports 
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the notion that manager controlled companies are seeking to diversify risks supporting the 
idea that the companies are engaging in conglomerate mergers for diversification. 
In a study a few years later Amihud et al. (1986) suggest that managerial diversification is not 
necessarily bad for the shareholders in when asymmetric information is present. Their work 
relies on various optimal contracting models and suggests that when measurement of the 
managerial effort is difficult the diversifying merger may be beneficial to both managers and 
the shareholders. This implies that if market for corporate control works efficiently the 
predicted motives for owner controlled and manager controlled companies are different. 
Manager controlled companies would initiate beneficial diversifying mergers whereas owner 
controlled companies would undertake a conglomerate merger only when a true synergistic 
reason exists. The empirical results suggest difference in announcement returns between 
conglomerate mergers announced by manager controlled companies vs. owner controlled 
companies supporting the hypothesis. 
Further empirical evidence from the 1960s’ merger wave supports the view that conglomerate 
mergers have been beneficial to shareholders and were not primarily motivated by agency 
issues (Matsusaka 1993). Matsusaka studied alternative motives for the US conglomerate 
mergers of the 1960s. The mergers could be motivated by shareholder value increasing 
reasons, such managerial synergy or market discipline, or by various agency issues, most 
importantly diversification. Basing his research on stock market response of the 
announcement he found that, overall, the market seemed to reward conglomerate mergers and 
that also the acquirer’s shareholders benefitted from the market response. This suggests that 
the acquisitions were not driven mainly by agency motives. In explaining the positive market 
response Matsusaka found that the response tended to be negative if the target management 
was fired providing support for the managerial synergy hypothesis against the managerial 
discipline hypothesis. However, interestingly enough he found relationship between the board 
independence and market reaction to the announcement: companies with high insider-to-
outsider ratio earned significantly less than those with low ratio suggesting that those 
transactions could have been motivated by agency issues. This is consistent with Amihud’s 
and Lev’s (1981) findings. 
2.3 MERGER THEORIES 
The most fundamental question in merger research is why mergers occur in the first place. 
Why companies choose to merger instead of forming strategic alliances, buying required 
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input or use any other alternative mean to achieve their desired goal? In this section I will 
present general theories of why mergers occur but discussing only the theories which are not 
specific to any particular merger type such as vertical or horizontal mergers. Merger theories 
specific to a particular type of merger were discussed in the section 2.2. 
Several generic mergers theories have been put forward over the decades and I classify them 
into three broad groups based on if real wealth is generated or not. The groups are 1) value 
increasing theories, 2) value redistributive theories and 3) value destroying theories. Weston 
et al. (2004)  use a slightly different classification where the theories are classified based on 
the value implications for the shareholders. 
 VALUE INCREASING THEORIES 2.3.1
Theories that postulate that motivation for merger is to gain an increase in the combined value 
for stakeholders are classified as “value increasing theories”, “synergy and efficiency 
theories” or “neo-classical theories”. This increase of shareholder value is a result of a real 
improvement in the operations of the company as opposed to result of a mere redistribution of 
wealth. It could be due to economics of scale or scope, cross-selling opportunities, reduction 
in fixed costs, elimination of redundancies or generally better management. Also increased 
market power could also be viewed as one such factor although from societal perspective it 
represents value redistribution or even value destruction due to deadweight losses generated 
by the increased monopoly power. 
Majority of studies conducted suggest that mergers do add value even if not all kinds of 
mergers are value adding. The biggest problem in comparison of the studies lies in the 
differences in methodology. Most studies with equal observation weighting have found that 
mergers create significant positive returns to targets and positive or zero returns to acquirers. 
For instance, Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) find that successful tender offers increased 
combined value by an average of 7.4%, though the returns to acquirers were largely 
insignificant. A tirade of subsequent studies has found similar results. 
In addition to stock market based event studies, a number of accounting and cash flow based 
studies have investigated the profitability of mergers. For instance, Healy, Palepu et al. (1992) 
studied post-merger performance of the merged entity using accounting data. They find that 
the companies enjoy increase in their post-merger operating cash flows which is due to 
increased efficiency in utilizing operational assets. There was no evidence to support notion 
that the observed improvements came from cutting funding from capital investments or R&D. 
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Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that markets are inefficient while managers are fully 
rational and seek to take advantage of market’s misvaluations of companies through 
acquisitions. In their model, mergers arise as a form of arbitrage where companies seek to 
acquire undervalued companies. This could take place as relatively more overvalued company 
taking over relatively less overvalued company and using its stock as payment method. 
2.3.1.1 OPERATIONAL SYNERGIES AND EFFICIENCIES 
Operational synergies and efficiencies are a broad class of gains that could be arising, for 
example, from economies of scale and scope, technological reasons, rationalization of 
production or any other synergies in production. While strictly speaking it is not impossible to 
have operational synergies in all types of mergers, common sense suggests that the potential 
for such is highest in horizontal and vertical mergers and more limited in conglomerate 
mergers. 
Economies of scale are said to occur when the average cost of production falls as the 
production increases. According to Damien and Röller (2005), there are two types of 
economies of scale: the short-run and long-run. The short-run economies of scale refer to 
cases in which the production involves non-scalable element, a kind of a fixed cost, which is 
not dependent on the production level. This could be billing or accounting department. 
Merger will allow companies to realize cost savings by eliminating the function in one of the 
companies. Long-run economies of scale in turn refer to situation where doubling of all 
factors of production lead to more than double increase in output. These efficiencies could 
arise from number of reasons such as when the output of the company is small, it may be 
preferable to invest little and to inferior technology. As the size of the company increases, 
more can be invested and to better technology. Furthermore, larger plants enable greater 
specialization which in turn can increase overall productivity. Finally, as a result of certain 
physical laws, energy costs associated with larger machines are proportionally smaller than 
those with smaller machines.
15
 
Economies of scope occur when production of two related goods in a same plant reduces the 
overall input costs. This could be due to a common input such as crude oil for production of 
                                                 
15
 Meaning that large machines are typically more energy efficient per unit of output than smaller machines. 
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diesel and benzene
16
. Similarly selling banking and insurance products in the same branch 
allows cost savings for producers and customers alike. 
Rationalization, according to Röller, refers to cost savings arising from shifting production 
from one facility to another without lowering the combined production possibilities of the 
merged company. Prior to the merger it is possible that marginal costs of production are 
different for different production plant. This could be due to a difference in capital used in 
production, due to a competitive advantage such as a patent or difference in capacity 
utilization. Shifting production from high marginal cost facility to a low marginal cost facility 
lowers overall costs of the company. 
Technological reasons for increased efficiency stem from either diffusion of knowledge or 
increased incentives for research and development. One or both of the companies might have 
superior knowledge in one or more areas of their business which can be applicable to the 
other company. Diffusion of knowledge as a result of the merger can allow both of the 
companies move closer to their joint production possibilities frontier. Merger could also 
create incentives to invest more into R&D, for instance if there are economies of scale in 
R&D or if R&D of the companies are somehow complementary. For example, civilian and 
military research on nuclear energy is highly complementary and even today military and 
civilian facilities of nuclear research are often joined. 
Although there is ample of research suggesting that mergers create value through reasons 
presented in this subsection, very little research has been done to investigate directly the 
efficiency hypothesis in production facilities. Most evidence is indirect as presented in section 
2.2.1.1.1. Despite strong indirect empirical support for the efficiency hypothesis and 
considerable explanatory power, it fails to predict or explain merger waves or why a particular 
method of payment is used in completing the transaction. 
2.3.1.2 STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
Corporate strategy is an entire research branch of its own so it is only natural that in this 
subsection I can only lightly touch the topic. However, I attempt to give the reader an idea 
what kind of strategic reasons for mergers can exist. I differentiate between two types of 
strategic levels: the corporate strategy and the owner strategy. 
                                                 
16
 Actually benzene is waste product of making diesel. 
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Corporate strategy is the strategy the corporate executives formulate and execute to maximize 
the company’s value. Perhaps the most famous article on corporate strategy is Porter’s (1979) 
five force’s model. It describes how five different larger “forces” shape the competitive 
position of an industry and a position of a company within its industry. These forces, rivalry 
among existing competition, threat of new entries, threat of substitute products, bargaining 
power of suppliers and bargaining power of customers, according to Porter, define industry’s 
and company’s profitability. Within this framework companies are able to influence these 
factors through strategic mergers and acquisitions. Companies may even want to strategically 
realign themselves or enter into new, unrelated business areas. Mergers can facilitate this 
transfer better than trying to develop those resources on their own. 
The owner’s strategy is the strategy that the owner of the company formulates and executes 
for maximizing his portfolio’s value and in this context the corporation is just an asset within 
a larger portfolio. To highlight the difference between the two strategies consider an 
enterprise with a single large owner. This owner could be a family or a rich individual or even 
a sovereign state. The ultimate owners of this enterprise can have strategic goals that not 
necessarily maximize of the value of the enterprise or other shareholders. These goals are 
communicated to the managers of the company who in turn formulate their own corporate 
strategy with the constraints given by the owners. 
Suppose a shareholder with a controlling stake of company is financially constrained and 
unwilling to give up controlling rights. He is likely to have significant proportion of his 
personal wealth in tied up in company meaning that his personal portfolio is sub-optimally 
diversified. Under these circumstances he might wish to balance his portfolio by having the 
company to undertake diversifying mergers. These mergers are likely to add nothing to the 
company value and quite likely even reduce it. From a well-diversified minority shareholder’s 
perspective the mergers are undesirable but from the majority shareholder’s perspective it is 
very desirable as it will enable him to diversify his assets without giving up the controlling 
rights in his company. 
Similar logic can be used even if the diversity of the majority shareholder’s asset portfolio is 
irrelevant. The “portfolio” can consist of non-financial assets as well. For example consider 
the Chinese state owned enterprises (SOE). During the past decade Chinese state owned 
corporations have aggressively expanded to other emerging markets and in particular to 
Africa. Buckley et al. (2007) found that contrary to multinationals of developed world, 
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Chinese multinationals seem rather insensitive to political risk. This is particularly true in 
African context where Chinese companies have been eager to expand. The authors suggest 
that this could be result of the state’s ownership artificially and falsely lowering the cost of 
capital for the companies. In practice this is achieved either by issuing of direct orders from 
the state or through subsidized loans through the state owned banks. In another study Deng 
(2004) noted that the government’s desire to secure critical raw materials to fuel the Chinese 
industry is likely to have influenced the Chinese SOEs decision to internationalize to markets 
in Africa and Latin America. Being very dependent on exports of manufactured goods, 
Chinese government has special interest in making sure that its industry is shielded from 
sudden shocks in raw material availability. For more detailed analysis see section 2.2.2.4. 
2.3.1.3 FINANCIAL SYNERGIES 
Financial synergies occur when the merging companies are able to obtain financing at better 
terms than as stand-alone entities. There are two proposed ways how this could happen. The 
first is that the merged entities effectively guarantee each other’s debt. This can result in the 
merged company having to pay lower interest on its debt and have larger borrowing capacity 
than either of the two companies alone. While this alone should not enhance the company’s 
value, the increased borrowing capacity can enable the company to undertake positive NPV 
projects that it otherwise would have been forced to pass on. Thus the increase in the 
enterprise value comes from the capacity to take additional positive NPV projects. 
The other way the financial synergies could be formed is if the external financial markets are 
unable to correctly price prospective projects of the companies due to information asymmetry 
or equivalent reason. Myears and Majluf (1984) present a model where the inefficiencies of 
external capital market can be overcome by using intra-firm internal capital market. A cash 
poor company facing lucrative investment opportunities could be acquired by cash rich 
company with limited investment prospects. The excess cash from the cash rich company 
could then be directed to the cash strapped company with plentiful of investment 
opportunities more effectively than that the external markets could do. Internal markets could 
work more efficiently than external under certain assumptions relating especially to 
information asymmetries. 
Both of the hypotheses above assume rational and beneficial management which is in direct 
confrontation with agency theory. Agency theory by Fama (1980) suggests that presence of 
excess cash reserves and cash flows actually incentivize management to financial 
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mismanagement. These two hypotheses represent two opposing but not mutually exclusive 
views. For more on agency theory see section 2.3.3. 
2.3.1.4 ELIMINATION OF UNDERPERFORMING MANAGEMENT 
Disgruntled shareholders are not the only source of fear for corporate executives. In fact, risk 
of being punished by shareholders may be minimally low for managers of companies who 
have very atomistic shareholder base. Organizing a proxy-fight against entrenched 
management is costly and not guaranteed to succeed. However, inefficient managers might be 
disciplined other ways through mechanism called “the market for corporate control”. 
Originally proposed by Manne (1965), the market for corporate control uses proxy fights, 
share purchases and mergers as way for punishing inefficient managers. Suppose a company 
with numerous atomistic shareholders with each very little individual incentive in trying to 
contest the incumbent management. Because of the mismanagement the stock price of the 
company is depressed and collectively the shareholders have a lot to gain by firing the 
management. However, in practice organizing shareholder resistance is very difficult and no 
one is willing to invest the time and money in it unless they have a considerable stake in the 
company. Despite this, the company’s depressed stock price is also the key to the salvation of 
the company as an external party could through “hostile” takeover seize the underperforming 
company, fire the incompetent management and turn the course of the company while 
realizing a sizable gain through stock price appreciation. According to Manne, mergers 
represent the most efficient way for the market for corporate control to function. 
There is considerable evidence suggesting that market for corporate control exists and that it 
works in the favor of the shareholders. In his article Jensen (1983) summarizes the evidence 
for and against for the hypothesis of the market for corporate control. He concludes that 
overall target’s shareholders seem to benefit, acquirer’s shareholders are no worse off and 
generally speaking it is difficult to find examples where acquirer’s management action would 
hurt shareholders in M&A context with the exception of defense tactic’s employed by the 
target’s management. 
2.3.1.5 SIGNALING 
Under assumption of semi-strong market efficiency markets should react to relevant new 
public information or revelation of previously private information. This information needs not 
to be explicit or direct but can also be implicit and indirect. The mere action of making an 
offer for a particular company could reveal previously private information about the acquirer, 
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target or the industry as a whole leading into a stock market reaction on announcement. This 
would be the case even if we assumed that mergers are value neutral i.e. they do not create or 
destroy value. In this context the markets react to the implicit information carried in the 
merger announcement rather than to the merger itself. 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) report that in their sample of tender offers the value of the 
company reverts back to its pre-announcement value if the tender is retracted or fails. This 
would suggest that signaling is not prevalent among tender offers. 
 VALUE REDISTRIBUTIVE THEORIES 2.3.2
Besides arguing that mergers create or destroy value, it is also possible that mergers are 
irrelevant in terms of total value created representing merely a redistribution of wealth. The 
redistributive theories propose that there can be a response in stock market price but any 
observed appreciation in stock price is actually a result of redistribution of wealth from other 
stakeholders such as the government, bondholders, consumers or labor unions. In other words, 
any gains achieved are away from some other stakeholder group and in the broader 
perspective cancel out each other. 
2.3.2.1 HUBRIS HYPOTHESIS 
Hubris hypothesis by Roll (1986) proposes that the management has overestimated the true 
value of the target and is willing to overpay for it. This means that the shareholders of the 
acquirer lose but this loss is offset by the gains of the target’s shareholders. Roll proposes that 
this overpaying might be a form of the winner’s curse. 
In Roll’s model, the management of the acquiring company is makes a private assessment of 
the value of the target. However, there is an inbuilt bias in this system. Shareholders of the 
target are rational and will not sell the company below its market value. If the acquirer’s 
management deems the true value of the target to be below its market value the merger will 
not proceed. Merger is attempted only if the acquirer’s management’s private valuation 
exceeds the market value. Assuming that the private valuation is a random variable with 
expected value of fair market valuation and non-zero error term, we observe only “bad” 
mergers taking place. This model would explain the modest or non-existent gains to the 
bidders. 
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Role of CEO overconfidence was analyzed in a study by Malmendier and Tate (2008) who 
using various proxies for overconfidence found that over confident CEOs are significantly 
and materially more likely to overpay for their targets and thus destroying shareholder value. 
This means that hubris mergers do not create new value as the gains to the target are offset by 
the losses of the acquirer. While typically this means that under hubris model mergers do not 
create overall returns, it does not actually rule out the possibility that synergies exist even 
when hubris is present. In this case hubris is visible in the overpaying by the acquirer and total 
creation of value. 
2.3.2.2 MARKET POWER 
It has been proposed that mergers are anti-competitive and the stock market gains merely 
reflect the collusive power brought about the merger. This could happen horizontally where 
customers and possibly suppliers lose out or vertically where the horizontal competitors are 
denied of raw materials or customers. However, according to Weston (2004) empirical 
evidence does not support this view although there is some evidence that market power plays 
a minor role in creation of merger gains. Among others, Fee and Thomas provide evidence 
supporting this position in horizontal mergers (Fee, Thomas 2004). Creation of market power 
as a motive for mergers is more extensively discussed in section 2.2.1.1.2. 
2.3.2.3 OTHER PROPOSED REDISTRIBUTIVE HYPOTHESES 
It has been suggested that mergers might also occur in order for companies to buy unused tax 
credits which would merely represent a reallocation of wealth from government to the 
shareholders without actually creating any new value. Hayn (1989) finds evidence that unused 
tax credits significantly explain the abnormal returns of mergers and that probability of a 
merger going through is affected by whether it is granted tax-free status by the IRS or not. 
However, the extent of how many mergers that are materially affected remains unclear. 
Asquith and Kim (1982) studied if the observed gains from mergers could be value 
redistributed from bondholders. In principle, the merger could affect the risk-return profile of 
the company where increased risk could boost the equity value of the company while 
reducing the debt value. However, they find no evidence supportive of the hypothesis. 
Mergers are often associated with news of layoffs and wage and/or benefit cuts. For various 
reasons the new management might be able to “shock” the unions and workers in the early 
days of the merger and be able to renegotiate labor contracts. The saving from these could 
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then be used to benefit the shareholders. Testing the hypothesis that hostile mergers target 
companies where employees are able to extract largest rents or quasi-rents Neumark and 
Sharpe (1996) studied if probability of being a target for hostile takeover was related to 
presence of high salary premium. Generally speaking they found no evidence for such 
behavior.  
 VALUE DESTROYING THEORIES 2.3.3
Extensive literature exists that proposes mergers are actually value destroying ventures. 
Common to all these theories is the role of the acquirer’s management as they source of the 
value destruction. Besides the obvious and simple “the management is incompetent” 
explanation, a more interesting concept was proposed in the 1970s. Derived from the agency 
theory, set of “agency problems” describe management that is reasonably rational or 
competent but act in the best interest of itself rather than that of the company’s owners. The 
root of the problem is the fact that in the modern corporation the ownership is separated from 
the management of the company. If not monitored or incentivized properly the management 
could actually be acting in its own interest rather than that of the shareholders’. For an 
overview of the agency literature see Eisenhardt (1989). 
“Agency problem” is an umbrella term that comprises a large array of different models, most 
common of which are presented in the following sub-sections. The agency problems have 
been widely documented in a number of interesting studies and are a source for a growing 
literature. 
2.3.3.1 FREE CASH FLOW PROBLEM 
Perhaps surprisingly, the root of the free cash flow problem is relative well-being of the 
company. In his article Jensen (1986) proposes that excess free cash flows incentive managers 
to wasteful investment rather than distributing the excess cash to the shareholders. Free cash 
flow is defined in this context being the excess of operational cash flows after financing of 
positive NPV investments and mandatory financial payments such as repayment of debt, 
interest and regular dividends. The management has incentive to invest this excess cash 
wastefully and according to Jensen, large part of this wasteful investment flow is directed to 
wasteful acquisitions. 
The risk for value destroying merger is elevated if the company has large free cash flow and 
plenty of unused debt capacity. Harford (1999) finds support for Jensen’s hypothesis. He 
studies companies with large cash reserves and finds that those companies are more likely to 
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engage into M&A activity than companies with limited cash reserves. Furthermore he finds 
that acquisitions by cash rich firms have negative abnormal returns and are more likely to be 
diversifying and have fewer bidders. 
2.3.3.2 DIVERSIFICATION PROBLEM 
Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest and provide evidence that the managers wish to reduce their 
employment risk through diversifying mergers. This is easy to understand considering that 
most top managers have disproportionate share of their assets and future cash flows tied to the 
fortunes of the company they are managing. As they often cannot achieve diversification 
through markets, they could seek to achieve it through lowering the business risk of the 
company they are managing. Diversification problem was more extensively discussed in 
Section 2.2.3.1 
2.3.3.3 MANAGERIAL EMPIRE-BUILDING 
Jensen (1986) suggests that besides desire to diversify, the management engages in M&A 
activity in order to realize private benefits. Top managers of large corporations might enjoy 
the status associated with running a large corporation and seek to maximize the prestige 
benefits of their position through acquisitions. Larger companies more often than not also 
offer better benefit than smaller companies to its managers. Finally, if the management 
compensation is tied to sales figures, number of subsidiaries or other size metric it could 
encourage myopic expansion of the company instead of improving its profitability. 
Empire-building is a fairly little studied topic in the management literature due to difficulty in 
determining what constitutes empire-building behavior and what is merely bad managerial 
practice. It may be easy to conclude that corporate jets, luxurious uptown HQ and fleet of 
executive limousines add little value to shareholders and are mere corporate splurge; however, 
it is considerably more difficult to determine the optimal number of employees or sales 
offices in a given region. In most cases managerial excess can only be detected indirectly 
based on the managerial results. Hope and Thomas find that (2008) multinational US 
corporations that do not voluntarily disclose geographic earnings results have above average 
sales and below average profitability in comparison to their peers that voluntarily disclose the 
geographic earnings results. This is consistent with Jensen’s (1986) suggestion that empire-
builders are more likely to boost sales and neglect profits. 
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2.4 M&A GAINS AND RESEARCH 
Value creation in mergers has been the primary interest in merger studies. Number of studies 
over the decades have studied do mergers actually create value and if so, what factors seem to 
be the most important in the value creation. The consensus is that gains observed do represent 
a genuine value creation and not a redistribution of existing wealth. Since then the focus has 
been on identifying the factors that foster value creation and research has identified a great 
number of significant factors ranging from deal specific to company and industry specific 
factors. 
 ACQUIRER AND TARGET GAINS 2.4.1
Virtually all merger studies have found positive returns for the shareholders of the target. 
Under the assumptions of free-markets and rational actors this is not a surprise. No rational 
investor is willing to give up their stake of a company for less than its prevailing market 
value. Furthermore, all merger theories suggest that the acquirer is willing to pay a premium 
for the target, be it for synergies, hubris or agency motivated. To summarize the results of the 
studies reviewed, majority of the papers indicate that merger related returns to targets are in 
the range of 15-30% and acquirers on average gain nothing in percentage terms. 
Acquirer gains are much more varied than target gains. Although some studies report of 
positive acquirer gains (Bradley, Desai & Kim 1988), most studies find that acquirer gains are 
not statistically significant from zero (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford 2001) or are even slightly 
negative (Dodd 1980). In the following paragraphs I will briefly go through some of the 
studies measuring target gains in mergers. It is worth noting that the literature on merger gains 
is very abundant and it is impractical and unnecessary to list all studies in this section. 
Therefore I will review just a few to give the reader an idea. 
Bradley et al. (1988) study a sample of 236 successful inter-firm tender offers between 1963 
and 1984. They find that on average target’s capture majority of the percentage and dollar 
measured merger gains. The acquirer gains are positive and significant for the whole 
observation period but were actually declining over time and the most recent sub-period 
experiencing actual negative returns for the acquirers. 
Andrade et al. report 16% return on target’s shareholders on a 3-day announcement window 
from a US sample of mergers from 1973 to 1998. The result is statistically significant and 
persists consistently across decades. Furthermore, the 16% return persists also across different 
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industries suggesting that the merger premiums are fairly similar in all types of mergers. 
Acquirer returns consistently but insignificantly negative across all periods. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) review a number of studies on merger gains. The studies reviewed 
suggest a weighted average return of 20.20% for targets of successful mergers. Acquirers on 
the other hand enjoy approximately zero returns although there is considerable variation. 
Jensen and Ruback also review the studies on unsuccessful bids and tenders and report that 
prior the failure or success of the merger, there is no major difference between the 
announcement returns indicating that markets expects roughly equal returns on both types of 
mergers. 
 BUILDING BLOCKS OF VALUE CREATION 2.4.2
Various factors have been found to affect value creation in mergers. Most important of these 
factors are presented in this subsection. The observed results do not always support just one 
merger theory but are consistent with multiple explanations. 
2.4.2.1 PAYMENT METHOD 
If mergers were only about synergies or agency issues, the method of financing the merger 
should have no effect on the value creation of the merger or returns to acquirer. However, this 
does not seem to be the case. A number of studies report that issuance of stock to finance 
investment projects, such as mergers, are associated with lower or negative returns (Dann, 
Mikkelson 1984, Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford 2001). To explain this observed phenomenon 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a model that suggests that mergers are partially driven by 
stock market misvaluations of the acquirer and the target and that this has impact of the 
payment method of the merger. In brief this means that companies have better knowledge 
about their intrinsic value than the shareholders. When the company is overvalued the 
management serving the interests of the existing shareholders has incentive to issue equity to 
buy the relatively less overvalued target. Assuming rational investors, knowing this they 
interpret the use of stock as payment method in absence of any other information as the 
overvaluation of the acquirer. 
2.4.2.2 COMPETITION AND BID REVISION 
Classical economic truth of more money chasing same goods leads to higher prices holds also 
for mergers. Common sense suggests that more willing buyers should lead into higher prices 
just like in a public auction. Bradley et al. (1988) hypothesize that additional bids for a 
company arise when the initial bid is too low. They also provide empirical evidence 
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consistent with this notion where targets gain more while acquirers lose when multiple 
bidders enter the competition or if the initial bid is revised upwards. 
2.4.2.3 ACQUIRER SIZE 
Moeller et al. (2004) find significant evidence that the acquirer size affects the total returns of 
merger indicating that large acquirers tend to fare far worse than small ones when measuring 
the announcement returns. They propose multiple reasons that could explain the results. Large 
companies could have more overconfident CEOs (Malmendier, Tate 2008) who are more 
susceptible hubris as proposed by Roll (1986). Larger company could also be closer to the end 
of its life cycle and thus have worse growth opportunities or large companies might be more 
likely to be overvalued and seek to buy relatively less overvalued assets with their stock 
(Shleifer, Vishny 2003). 
2.4.2.4 TARGET MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE 
The issue of target management attitude is theoretically problematic since the effect could go 
either way depending on theory. According to Jensen and Ruback (1983), entrenched and 
inefficient management is likely to resist takeover which would remove them from power. 
Their attempts to resist would obviously be destructive to the shareholder value. However, if 
management is assumed to have better knowledge about the intrinsic value of the company 
than the markets like in Shleifer and Vishny model (2003), attempts to resist the takeover to 
extract a better price are then shareholder value increasing. Some empirical evidence 
consistent with both hypotheses is mentioned in Jensen and Ruback (1983). 
2.4.2.5 INDUSTRIAL RELATEDNESS 
Industrial relatedness is closely related to the type of the merger and degree of that 
relatedness. In other words, is the merger horizontal, vertical or conglomerate and to what 
extent. Traditionally the focus has been on horizontal vs. non-horizontal mergers identified by 
SIC/NAICS codes. However, as I will demonstrate in section 4.2.2 this is very much an 
inadequate way of classifying mergers as it fails to properly account for vertical product 
relations. Why would relatedness matter? As the theories presented in sections 2.2 and 2.3 
state synergies and efficiencies are more likely to be present when the merging companies are 
related one way or another. So the greater degree of industrial relatedness is a proxy for 
operational synergies. On the other hand, unrelated mergers could be more likely to be result 
of agency issues or other dubious motives. 
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Empirical evidence for industrial relatedness is surprisingly weak. Sudarsanam et al. (1996) 
conducted a study of different sources of value creation and its division between the acquirer 
and the target in the UK. The sample includes 429 successful mergers and acquisitions in the 
1980 to 1990 period. Overall they find that synergies are an important source of wealth 
creation in mergers and one of their explanatory variables is industry relatedness. It is a 
dummy variable taking value of one if both companies share the same London Stock 
Exchange Industry Classification (SEIC) code and zero otherwise. It is worthy to note that the 
classification can accurately detect only horizontal relatedness as the SEIC is structurally 
similar to SIC/NAICS. Considering this the result was perhaps a bit unsurprising: they found 
no significant link for industrial relatedness and merger gain. 
Chatterjee (1986) finds evidence that targets in unrelated mergers outperform targets in 
related mergers, non-horizontal mergers. There is no similar anomaly in acquirer returns 
which could suggest that in case of related, non-horizontal mergers, the bargaining power and 
thus the bargaining outcome between the parties is more equal. However, the data of 
Chatterjee’s study cannot unambiguously reject or not reject such notion. 
Flanagan (1996) analyzed previous studies and finds that empirical evidence seems not to 
support the idea that industrial relatedness enhances value creation. He then correctly points 
out that previous classification methods have been inaccurate and the previously observed 
results could merely reflect this reality. Using SIC codes in combination with “Moody’s 
Corporate Manuals” and “Mergers and Acquisitions Magazine” he classifies a sample of 60 
mergers from1972 to 1990 as either related or unrelated. He finds that acquirers have 
significantly worse returns (-9%-points) in unrelated mergers than in related mergers. These 
findings are consistent with the notion that industrial relatedness promotes value creation. 
What is the impact of industrial relatedness in the end? The jury is still out but based on 
current evidence it looks likely that synergies and efficiencies created by industrial 
relatedness are reflected in the stock prices of the companies. 
2.5 STUDIES ON DISTRIBUTION OF MERGER GAINS 
The first notion about the distribution of merger gains was the observation that the targets 
tend to earn greater percentage returns on the merger announcement than the acquirers. While 
this view is popular and in most cases very much true, it is not the entire picture. Since then 
the literature has acknowledged that measuring just percentage returns gives misleading 
48 
 
picture as the targets are typically much smaller than the acquirers (Moeller, Schlingemann & 
Stulz 2004, Ahern 2012among others). Furthermore, in estimating synergic benefits prior to a 
merger, it is more natural to think of the joint gains in terms of dollars or euros than in more 
abstract percentage terms. Examining the division of dollar denominated returns gives more 
realistic and tangible point of reference for estimating the distribution of gains than the more 
abstract dollar return. 
In recent decades a larger literature has evolved that examines gains separately to the bidder 
and the target in mergers. However, surprisingly little attention has been given to how the 
total dollar gains are divided between the shareholders of the two firms. The matter of 
division is not a trivial matter; mergers represent the largest single transaction of any 
corporation and the division of gains is primary interest to both of the companies. Prior 
literature has mostly investigated the division question from the agency problems perspective. 
For example a number of studies have found that large managerial control rights increase 
premiums paid by the acquirers and decreases the possibility of a tender offer being accepted 
(Stulz 1988, Stulz, Walkling & Moon H. Song 1990). It is not only the acquirers who are 
affected. Wulf (2004) found evidence that the targets’ CEOs trade premiums for personal 
power in post-merger organization in “merger of equals” deals. 
While studying the agency aspects of the mergers is not wrong it gives rather incomplete 
view. Agency perspective is important for many practical and ethical reasons but it is hardly 
the only factor affecting the distribution of gains. Common sense and the standard economic 
argument say that the party with higher BATNA
17
 captures the greater share of the joint gains 
(Whinston 2003). In other words, the party with better outside option tends to fare better in 
negotiations
18
. While better outside options can come from variety of sources, the most likely 
factor in context of vertical mergers is the intensity and asymmetry of product market 
relations. While direct threats or use of coercion in negotiations seems unlikely, the mere 
awareness of asymmetric mutual dependency could be enough to influence the outcome of the 
negotiations. 
                                                 
17
 BATNA stands for ”Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement”. It is set by the best alternative option to the 
merger with the other party. 
18
 Not just in mergers but in negotiations in general. 
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Different motives for mergers also imply differential bargaining power and consequently 
different distribution of gains in a merger. In synergistic mergers where contributions or 
assets from both companies are required to realize the synergies the distribution of gains 
should be more equal than in mergers where hubris (Roll 1986) or agency motives (Jensen, 
Ruback 1983) are present. Managerial hubris in absence of synergies is merely going to 
transfer value from acquirer to target and thus means that it is the target which is going to gain 
the most. Similar logic can be extended to agency motives: assuming target management is 
rational, they will not lose out in a merger but the acquirer motivated by agency motives is. 
Bradley Desai and Kim (1988) provide empirical evidence that competition among bidding 
firms increases returns to the target at the expense of the acquirer. Furthermore, they find that 
changes in the legal and institutional environment of tender offers have significantly affected 
the division of gains between the shareholders of the target and the acquirer.  
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3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
Existing literature suggests that there are many theoretical reasons to believe that vertical 
mergers have potential to create value to shareholders of both companies. Source of those 
gains can be increases in real efficiency and synergies (Neven, Röller 2005), reduction of 
transaction costs or chances for opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1973, Grossman, Hart 
1986) or increases in market power (Chen 2001). Creation of joint gains in mergers raises the 
problem of distributing the gains in one way or another and the bigger the gains are the bigger 
the problem becomes. 
The distribution of gains is determined by the bargaining power of the companies involved. 
The bargaining power on the other hand can come from multiple sources. It could come from 
operational excellence as suggested by neo-classical theories, it may stem from controlling a 
crucial asset as suggested by transaction cost economics or it can come from dominance in 
one of the product markets the company is involved in. All of these situations can be 
described through the options or alternatives available to each party. Bargaining power is in 
essence a good selection of alternative courses of action whereas lack of bargaining power is 
in essence the same as lack of good alternatives. 
When two companies choose to merge, the common wisdom suggests that it is the target that 
captures the lion’s share of the gains. Superficial analysis of the merger history seems to 
support this notion when only percentage returns of the stock are observed ignoring the size 
difference between the companies which would inflate the percentage returns of the smaller 
party. Furthermore, it is plausible that different types of mergers have different mechanisms 
determining the division of merger gains. For example, it is plausible that a merger motivated 
by empire building has different typical distribution of gains if compared to a vertical merger. 
In case of vertical mergers it is obvious that there is mutual dependence of certain degree 
between the parties since the companies are engaged in trading. While both companies have 
some degree of dependency on each other this dependency can be highly asymmetric. As an 
extreme example consider a cigarette manufacturer and a paper mill. The relationship between 
the two is clearly one-way since paper is used by the cigarette manufacturer to wrap the 
tobacco while no cigarettes are needed to make paper. The cigarette factory needs paper to 
make its products and there are no substitutes for paper. Then again paper of similar grade is 
used in various applications across number of different industries. As a matter of fact sales to 
cigarette industry constitute only a small fraction of the overall sales of the paper industry. In 
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case these two companies decided to merge, it is likely that the less dependent party 
commands more bargaining power ceteris paribus. In other words, the paper mill would likely 
to have upper hand in the merger negotiations and capture greater share of the joint gains of 
this merger. 
The primary goal of this thesis is to investigate does the asymmetry in the intensity of the 
customer-supplier relationship in product markets as described above transfer into bargaining 
power when a company chooses to buy its supplier or customer and bring the transaction from 
external markets to internal markets. Measuring this kind of asymmetry is not entirely 
straightforward with any single variable. However, measuring how big customer the customer 
is to the supplier and how important is the supplier to the customer in producing its final 
output is a good proxy. Although it does not necessarily reflect the substitutability of inputs it 
none the less reflects the scale of involvement of the both parties. 
If asymmetric mutual dependency does in fact create bargaining power for either of the 
players, then it has to be reflected in the outcome of the negotiations. The party that has upper 
hand in the negotiations should be able to extract more value for himself from the merger than 
the other party. Unfortunately, the mere price paid tells us very little as there are many other 
factors affecting the outcome of the negotiations. However, we need not necessarily to 
analyze the favorability of a contract ourselves. If both the target and the acquirer are 
publically traded companies and if we further more assume that the financial markets are 
semi-strongly efficient, by observing the stock market reaction to the merger announcement 
we are able to extract information about the outcome of the merger negotiations. Assuming 
that all previous relevant information is already incorporated to the stock price and that no 
new information irrelevant
19
 to net present value of the merger is not revealed as a result of 
the deal, the aggregate stock market reaction should only reflect the value creation (or 
destruction) of the deal multiplied by the probability of the deal going through as it is. 
Since completion of the merger requires the approval from both companies, the actual 
probability of merger succeeding does not affect the euro denominated distribution of how the 
value created or destroyed by the merger. By making assumption that managers are at least as 
                                                 
19
 Irrelevant to the merger NPV refers to new information that would reflect information that would impact the 
company even if the merger does not go through. This would for example information such as the competency of 
the companies’ executives. 
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rational and well informed as the market, the acquirer will not pass an offer that it thinks is 
not acceptable to the other company where as the target will not accept a deal that the market 
thinks is unfair. From these assumptions it follows that the market reaction to the first merger 
announcement should reflect the value distribution outcome of the proposed deal irrespective 
if the deal passes or fails and for this reason we need not to limit ourselves merely to 
completed transactions. 
At the moment the European Union is the largest single market in the world surpassing that of 
the United States. In terms of variety in economic activities the EU is almost as diverse as the 
US.  For these reasons studying how product market dependencies affect bargaining outcomes 
in the EU economy offers a large and balanced sample of companies in multiple industries. 
However, although the Union has gone through unprecedented expansion and integration over 
the course of the past 20 years, large cultural and linguistic barriers still exist. This makes it 
interesting comparison to Ahern’s (2012) work which studies this question in the United 
States, a country culturally and linguistically much more integrated than the EU. I follow 
Ahern’s footsteps and investigate the same question with corresponding European data to see 
if his results hold also for Europe. 
For technical and clarity reasons the sample is divided into smaller subsamples along the 
following lines: backwards and forward vertical mergers as well as all mergers and positive 
net gains subsamples. Next I will briefly go through the mathematical formulation of the 
study and its key parameters. 
In essence, to conduct the study we need to observe the co-variation of the distribution of 
merger gains between the target and the acquirer and the relevant sources of bargaining 
power. The net gains from merger can be calculated using the following equation: 
(1) 
                     
where 
PVSAT = net present value of gains brought by a merger to the acquirer and the target 
PVAT = net present value of the combined entity’s equity after the merger announcement 
PVA = net present value of the acquirer’s equity before the merger announcement 
PVT = net present value of the target’s equity before merger announcement 
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In the study I use two different measures for division of gain between the target and the 
acquirer both of which are more closely explained in Section 4.2.1. The first measure is meant 
for samples of all mergers whereas the second is used in the positive gains subsample. The 
reason for using two different measures is because when either party has negative returns, 
thinking about division of gains as a pie to be split makes no sense. So for time being I shall 
only refer to ∆$CAR as the indicator of division of gains. 
Next we also need to define the variables of interest that proxy bargaining power arising from 
asymmetric vertical relations. For this purpose I use two variables which are properly defined 
in Section 4.2.2.2 but for now I only refer them as RSI and RBI.
20
 The first one proxies the 
bargaining power of the supplier and the latter the bargaining power of the customer. 
Naturally there are plenty of other variables that have been demonstrated to have impact on 
bargaining outcome such as method of payment, however for now I refer them only as other 
variables and they are collectively denoted as  . The following equation summarizes what has 
been said above. 
(2) 
                   
where 
∆$CAR = measure of division of gains 
RSI = relative supplier importance 
RBI = relative buyer importance 
ϑ = other variables 
In other words, the distribution of gains is a function of RSI, RBI and other variables. This 
study investigates if RSI and RBI are one way or another a related to division of gains as 
measured by ∆$CAR. If there is a statistically significant relationship I expect the sign of RSI 
and RBI to depend on the selected subsample. This is because the dependent variables are 
calculated as target’s share of the total gains. When the supplier is the target, the RSI, which 
proxies supplier’s bargaining power, should have positive coefficient. This is reversed when 
supplier is the acquirer and greater gains to supplier mean smaller gains to the target. 
                                                 
20
 RSI stands for Relative Supplier Importance and RBI for relative Buyer Importance. 
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Analogously, the RBI is expected to have positive coefficient when the customer company is 
the target and negative when it is the acquirer. 
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4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
It is a blatant banality to state that any model is only as good as the input used in it but the 
importance of appropriate sample data selection cannot be stressed enough. Disturbingly high 
number of studies and analysis recently presented in the media has been based on dubious 
data or questionable methodology used to analyze that data. From society’s point of view this 
is dangerous if policies are based on poorly conducted research. From this thesis point of 
view, poor data and incorrect methods are equally dangerous as with larger societal 
perspective. 
In this chapter I will explain from where and how the data are sourced, processed and used. I 
have attempted to include as much relevant metadata as possible to justify that the sample 
used is sufficiently unbiased. However, due to large amount of metadata, only a fraction of it 
is presented here. The rest is either left out from this thesis or included in the appendix 
without detailed analysis. Also presented in this chapter are the methodologies used and the 
justification of their use. The use of alternative methodologies is discussed as well as the 
potential impact for using them. I have made it my priority to justify my choices as 
convincingly as possible since choice of methodology could in some cases crucially affect the 
results. While the results of this study are unlikely to have any kind of relevance to the 
policymakers, I am very much attracted to the ideal of obtaining as “true” knowledge as 
possible. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In the first part the data collection and processing are 
explained and analyzed. The second part is devoted to methodological issues. In the third part 
I explain the use of event study methodology in this study. 
4.1 DATA 
In this section I first discuss the sources of data and how it was processed. Then I proceed to 
critically evaluate the potential biasedness in the data. 
 DATA SOURCES 4.1.1
This study draws its data from multiple public and private databases. Data on mergers is from 
SDC International Merger Database while the market and financial data are from Thomson 
One Banker. To be included in the final sample the merger had to be announced between 
1.1.1990 and 1.6.2012 and the acquirer and the target had to have domicile and be publically 
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listed in Switzerland, Norway or one of the EU15 countries
21
. The acquirer may not own 
more than 50% of the target’s shares prior the announcement and must seek to own more than 
50% after the transaction. Finally both the target and the acquirer had to have the necessary 
financial and market data for constructing regression variables available from around the 
announcement date in Thomson One Banker database. 
The reader may wonder why are not all European Union countries included in the sample 
while two non-EU members are – and with a good reason. Leaving out some countries could 
leave out part of the economic diversity which would add to the robustness of the results. 
However, in practice reality certain practical and theoretical issues complicate it. The main 
reason for this is data availability: SDC does not have many observations from the new EU 
members, such as the Baltic countries or the Eastern European
22
 countries. On the other hand, 
there are two highly developed countries with good coverage in SDC that are not EU 
members but are nevertheless strongly integrated to the European economy, namely Norway 
and Switzerland. For this reason I decided to include the only the EU15 and two EFTA 
members, Norway and Switzerland. I also considered inclusion of Iceland but due to its 
relatively small economy and industry base as well as its abnormal ventures in banking and 
finance related mergers in the late 2000s I decided to exclude it. 
The requirements for pre and post-announcement ownership were included to make sure that 
only transaction where the control of the target company changes hands if the deal succeeds. 
Without the restriction the database would have returned also transaction where only a stake 
in a company was acquired. However, the completion of the deal is not a requirement and 
thus the sample includes also withdrawn and pending transactions. The reason for this is that I 
am interested in the perceived synergies in the vertical integration and not realized synergies. 
Choice of time frame was affected by two contrasting needs. While the primary interest is in 
understanding the prevailing situation, using just a few years of data would likely to yield 
sample sizes too small. Then again data availability was severely restricted before the early 
1990s. Since according to SDC’s supporting notes, their data collection in Europe started only 
                                                 
21
 EU15 countries consist of the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
22
 Furthermore, it is questionable if the industrial structure and development of  those countries matches that of 
the western European countries or the USA too 
57 
 
in 1984, it seems likely that number of early observations were not recorded. Furthermore the 
availability of the market data is also more restricted beyond that date. Therefore as a 
reasonable compromise I decided to draw the sample from mergers, acquisitions and asset 
purchases that were announced between 1.1.1990 and.1.6.2012. 
Restriction on availability of market and financial data for both the target and the acquirer is 
set because without complete, data running the regressions would not be possible. The daily 
stock market return data along with number of control variables are obtained from Thomson 
One Banker using a set of inter-database identifiers provided by SDC. Results obtained are 
validated manually to make sure that the identifier actually returns the same company name as 
SDC gives. Once this is done the results from different identifiers are consolidated and 
collected into a database for further use. 
With these restrictions the final sample consists of 815 merger announcements from 1990 to 
mid-2012. The sample was primarily shrunk by the unavailability or low quality of data from 
Thomson One Banker. This issue is more thoroughly explained in Appendix A. 
In addition to the merger and financial data, I need to first identify potential for vertical 
relation and then measure the intensity of that potential. For both purposes I use the Make and 
Use tables of the Benchmark Input-Output Accounts for year 2002 as prepared by the US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. More careful explanation of what are I/O accounts and why 
their use is justified is found in Section 4.2.2.1. Lastly, the data on market concentration on 
different industries are from the Economic Census conducted by the US Census Bureau. 
 BIASEDNESS AND REPRESENTATIVENESS 4.1.2
To draw inferences from the sample requires that the sample is unbiased and representative of 
the population. In theory, this boils down to a question: did every observation have equal 
chance to be included in the sample? As SDC is not a complete database, biases in the 
collection of the information can bias the sample. In this case there are three major potential 
sources of selection bias present in the data collection: nationality, time period and company 
size. Nationality bias arises when information collector focuses more on countries where the 
information is more easily accessible or which are deemed more important economies to 
follow such as the UK, France, Germany and Italy. Time period bias arises if in some years 
larger fraction of mergers is included in the sample than other years and there are differences 
between different years. Finally company size can affect if data about the company is added 
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to the data base. Focusing on these sources of potential bias I will next assess the likely extent 
the biases in the sample. 
Table 1: Proportion of merges by country compared to the country's relative size of equity markets 
Country 
Relative size of 
equity markets 
Mergers 
by SDC 
Mergers in 
final 
sample 
Austria 0.9 % 1.0 % 1.4 % 
Belgium 2.0 % 1.5 % 0.9 % 
Denmark 1.5 % 2.5 % 1.3 % 
Finland 1.1 % 1.6 % 1.5 % 
France 12.3 % 12.5 % 4.1 % 
Germany 10.1 % 7.3 % 11.0 % 
Greece 0.3 % 1.9 % 5.6 % 
Ireland 0.7 % 1.4 % 1.0 % 
Italy 3.3 % 4.8 % 11.2 % 
Luxembourg 0.5 % 0.4 % 0.0 % 
Netherlands 4.4 % 3.5 % 3.3 % 
Norway 1.7 % 3.3 % 7.1 % 
Portugal 0.4 % 0.8 % 2.3 % 
Spain 6.7 % 3.5 % 6.8 % 
Sweden 3.8 % 6.9 % 9.5 % 
Switzerland 7.3 % 3.6 % 3.6 % 
United Kingdom 20.5 % 43.4 % 29.4 % 
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As I was unable to find year by year statistic of actual merger transactions across countries I 
assess the potential nationality bias by looking at the relative sizes of the market capitalization 
of the countries included in my sample. I then compare this figure to the SDC’s distribution of 
mergers. I am aware that size of the stock market does not equal merger activity as but it is an 
easy and intuitive back of the envelope check in absence of better information. The first 
column of Table 1 shows the relative 
sizes of equity markets at the end of 2012 
within the sample countries while the second 
column indicates the proportion of mergers 
where at least one party is from the listed 
country according to SDC.
23
 The third column 
indicates the actual number of mergers that 
were included in the sample after all data 
criteria are implemented leaving total of 798 
mergers in the final sample. The same 
information is graphically presented in 
Figures 1-3.  
                                                 
23
 Source: http://www.quandl.com/economics/stock-market-capitalization-all-countries retrieved 6.5.2013. 
Figure 2: Relative market capitalization of sample countries 
Figure 3: National distribution of mergers in SDC 
Figure 1: National distribution of mergers in final sample 
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Generally the share of mergers corresponds quite well with the relative size of the equity 
market although there are few notable exceptions. The UK clearly dominates in the share of 
mergers but this is not surprising considering that UK has far less regulated equity markets 
than most European countries. All in all it appears unlikely that there is nationality bias in the 
SDC database. When looking at the final sample used in the study reveals a few anomalies 
that arise from imposing the data restrictions. The relative shares of the UK and France fall 
sharply while relative shares of Italy and Norway more than double. Luxembourg is 
completely eliminated from the sample. Closer inspection reveals that availability of one of 
the four accounting data items explains most of the elimination. It is likely that this will 
slightly bias the sample towards larger companies and more recent observations as most of the 
missing data is from the early years and it is conceivable that large companies are more likely 
to have their accounting data included in the database. 
There is evidence that some mergers are missing from the early years. For example, for the 
boom year 1985 the database records only 27 mergers throughout the sample of 17 countries. 
In comparison the data suggest that the year 1990 saw 161 mergers. It seems unlikely that 
such growth has happened in reality. It is difficult to say how severely this affects the sample 
as my data collection for this reason starts from year 1990. However, it is likely that small 
mergers are more likely to be excluded from the sample than large ones. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of mergers in time. This figure shows that there is no unusual clustering in the mergers in time. 
While the sample has is not entirely unbiased, it is unlikely that these issues would seriously 
bias the sample since all the major European economies have representation, none of the 
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countries is dominating the sample and the merger activity is distributed as roughly expected 
across the sample time period. It seems unlikely that any of the issues listed above would 
influence the outcome of the study one way or another. 
4.2 METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS 
Results of any study are not only heavily dependent on the sample used but also on 
methodology used. For this reason careful consideration has to be given also to the choice of 
methods used. In this section I am going to explain my methodological choices and how do 
they compare to other similar studies. All procedures used in this research are described in 
detail sufficient enough to permit accurate replication of the study. 
This study uses the event study methodology in combination with OLS regressions. Both 
methods are widely employed in studies similar to mine. They are theoretically and 
empirically robust and permit the assessment of the results with various statistical tools. I will 
first explain the regression equation and its variables and then explain merger classification 
The event study methodology is explained at the end of this chapter. 
 MEASURES OF THE DIVISION OF GAINS 4.2.1
The first step in defining the regression models is to define the dependent variable. In this 
case it is a measure for division of gains. The merger outcome in terms of gains is measured 
using the sum of the acquirer’s and target’s abnormal euro returns surrounding the 
announcement of the deal. Measuring only the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is not 
enough since often the merging companies are not equal in size. Due to this difference using 
only the percentage returns would give misleading picture of the actual distribution of the 
merger gains. To be more concrete, imagine two companies A and B that are negotiating a 
merger. Suppose that the net present value of the mutually perceived combined gains of the 
merger total 5 euros. Furthermore, let us assume that the pre-merger market value of company 
A is 100 and the market value of the company B is 10. If A makes a bid of 12 for company B 
and B accepts, the rational market reaction to the announcement is that the market value of A 
should become 103 (100 + 10 + 5 – 12 = 103) and the market value of company B should 
increase to 12. In percentage terms A gains 3% while B gains 20%. Looking only at the 
percentage gains it looks like the target (B) captures bulk of the merger gains. However, the 
tables are turned if we investigate the division of the merger gains in euro denomination. 
Total gains is 5 of which A captures 3 or 3/5= 60% while B gets only 40%. Since I am 
interested how the dependent variables effect the bargaining outcomes (which should on 
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average reflect bargaining power), it is more appropriate to observe the euro-weighted 
distribution of the gains rather than a measure based on the percentage gains. 
To measure division of gains, ideally I would like to measure the target’s percentage share of 
the total gains. In principle this is fairly straightforward, it is like splitting a “pie of gains”. 
However, this analogy breaks down if either or both of the parties have negative returns. In 
these cases I cannot simply divide the share of acquirer’s or target’s euro returns by the sum 
of the returns. To circumvent this problem, I calculate the division of the abnormal returns by 
taking the difference of the target’s abnormal euro returns and subtract the acquirer’s 
abnormal euro returns from it. To normalize the results for regression, I divide the difference 
by the combined market cap of the two companies 50 days before the announcement of the 
merger. This measure represents the relative gain of the target vs. the acquirer for each euro of 
total market value and I denote it by ∆$CAR throughout this paper. For mathematical 
formulation of this idea, see Equation 3 below. I will also identify a subsample of mergers 
where both the target and the acquirer have positive returns and will use the more intuitive 
“pie splitting” approach there. How all this is done in detail is explained in the Section 4.3. 
(3) 
      
           
         
 
where 
$CARA = cumulative euro abnormal return of the acquirer 
$CART = cumulative euro abnormal return of the target 
MVEA = market value of equity of the acquirer 
MVET = market value of equity of the target 
The interpretation for this variable is following. Value zero indicates equal distribution of 
dollar gains or losses. Positive values indicate that target has gained more while negative 
values indicate that the acquirer gained more. The variable lacks everyday meaningful 
economic interpretation but it can be thought as how many cents the target gains more than 
the acquirer per each euro of combined market value of the two companies. The great 
advantage of this way of measuring division is that it can also deal with negative euro returns 
consistently. 
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 MEASURES OF INDUSTRIAL RELATEDNESS 4.2.2
To test the hypothesis that customer-supplier relationships influence the division of gains in 
mergers I have first classify each merger. That is to identify each merger either as horizontal, 
vertical forward, vertical backward, vertical indeterminate or conglomerate. Correctly 
classifying mergers with significant vertical integration potential is not an easy task. 
Theoretically correct way of doing this is to go through every transaction and assess if actual 
vertical trading or potential for vertical trading exists. However, this is a very labor intensive 
way and not entirely without problems. Therefore an alternative way is needed for tracking 
industrial relations and classifying mergers. 
Previous studies have relied on SIC/NAICS codes to detect relatedness between the acquirer 
and the target. While fairly good at detecting horizontal mergers, this measure is inaccurate 
and unsatisfactory for finding vertical mergers because SIC and NAICS classify industries 
based on similarity of output (SIC) or similarity of production process (NAICS) rather than 
vertical relations. For example oil exploration, extraction, refining and retail sales are all 
clearly and unquestionably vertically related. However, in NAICS and SIC most of the 
different stages of the final product (refined gasoline) are fall under different 2-digit SIC and 
NAICS codes. For example, under NAICS (2012) “Crude petroleum and natural gas 
extraction” industry falls under code 211111, “Drilling oil and gas wells” under 213111, “Oil 
and gas pipeline and related structures construction” 237120, “Petroleum refineries” under 
324110 and “Gasoline stations” under 447110. While it is clear that all of these activities are 
vertically related and essential components of the supply chain, it would be impossible to 
identify using just NAICS codes alone. Other studies have used laborious manual inspection 
to identify supplier-customer relationships, for example one of Fee and Thomas (2004) that 
investigates the impact of horizontal mergers on vertical trading partners. 
However, another way exists around this problem. Customer-supplier relations are essentially 
exchanges of commodities or services for money. Tracking these flows of the company and 
its competitors would serve as an excellent proxy for detecting vertical integration or potential 
for it. It turns out that data very similar to this do exist. Various countries collect information 
on commodity flows in the economy on an aggregate level, typically by macro-industry. This 
information is collected into so called Input-Output (or just “I/O”) tables which are very 
useful in conducting number of different economic analyses. In essence, I/O tables track 
down the flow of raw materials and intermediate goods as they flow through the economy to 
the final users i.e. to consumers or to exports. Number of countries collect and publish 
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different kinds of I/O data that are publically available to anyone, however, the standards and 
detail of such data vary greatly. 
4.2.2.1 USING INPUT-OUTPUT TABLES 
The Input-Output tables are a collection of different matrices that track the flow of goods and 
money as they flow through the economy. The exact components of each I/O set varies 
between countries but the main components are the “Make” or “Supply” table and the “Use” 
table. In addition, the I/O set often include various supplements which detail the material 
flows or trade. The make table effectively tells what goods different industries produce and 
what is their monetary value. The use table on the other hand lists all the goods produced in 
the economy and which industries use them and their monetary value. For more detailed 
description of the Make and Use tables see Appendix B. 
It is very important to realize at this stage that the Make and Use tables do not give 
information about who is using whose products. Even if industry A produces commodity Z 
and the industry B uses commodity Z it does not mean that industry A and B actually trade 
certain amount of commodity Z. It is very much possible that industry A exports all of its 
output while industry B gets its input from industry C who is a secondary producer of Z. For 
this reason using the I/O analysis measures the potential for vertical trade on the industry 
level – not actual trade. Even if we could deduce that industry A and B actually traded, we 
could not guarantee that company 1 belonging to industry A and company 2 belonging to 
industry B trade in real life. However, we can say with high degree of confidence that 
potential for vertical trade between company A and B does exist. 
In combination the Make and Use tables can be used to build a model of a supply chain, or 
actually more accurately, a supply web. From that model we can construct two simple 
measures that can be used determine direction of the supplier-customer relationship and to 
proxy the intensity or importance of the product market relationship. However, before 
venturing into that an important decision must be made. Since most industries produce 
secondary commodities in addition to their primary product we must make decision should 
we track all commodities produced by the supplier or only the main product? The advantage 
of including more than just the primary product is that it can better find relations which 
happen at the secondary product level. However, this comes at a cost. It is likely to introduce 
a lot of noise as well since some goods are produced by multiple industries but that those 
goods are traded within that industry. For example most manufacturing industries also 
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produce specialized computer software which is listed on the Make table. Computer software 
in industrial setting is very specific product and it is unlikely that such products are very 
useful outside the industry itself. Since specialized computer software is used in many 
industries it would be more than likely to find “potential” links that do not in real life exist. 
Suppose a merger between insurance company and a pulp mill. Although it is obvious that 
such merger would be conglomerate, this system would indicate that it has vertical component 
via specialized computer software that in reality does not exist. There are ways to address this 
problem such as ignoring product categories that are so vague that would permit formation of 
arbitrary links or giving weights to the importance of production. However, both measures 
require considerable subjective judging on what products to drop or what should be the 
threshold for considering a weighted figure significant enough. For these reasons I opt for 
tracking just the primary product. 
4.2.2.2 CONSTRUCTING VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
In this study I am using the I/O tables of the United States economy provided by the US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The reader may be puzzled by this choice; after all, the rest of 
the data are from Europe. The main reason is of course lack of suitable data from Europe; 
however, using US data should not affect the results. This is further discussed in the Section 
4.2.4. In the following subsections I will explain the two main explanatory variables I 
construct to measure the intensity of the customer-supplier relationship. 
The starting point is to convert the NAICS
24
 codes provided by SDC to the corresponding I/O 
codes using concordance table by BEA. Then following Ahern (2012) and Fan et. Goyal 
(2006) I construct Relative Supplier Importance score (RSI) and Relative Buyer Importance 
score (RBI) to proxy the mutual dependency of the two companies. RSI measures the 
customer’s dependency on the supplier and it is calculated by taking the dollar amount of 
purchases of the customer from the supplier and dividing it by the total production output 
value of the customer. In other words RSI is the fraction of the input from the supplier that the 
customer requires to produce one dollar worth of output. 
(4) 
                                                 
24
 NAICS stands for “North American Industry Classification System” and it was designed to be the successor to 
the SIC system. 
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RBI on the other hand measures the supplier industry’s dependency on the customer industry. 
It is calculated as the dollar amount of the output sold by the supplier industry to the customer 
industry divided by the total dollar output of the supplier industry. In plain English this is the 
fraction of the production bought by the customer from the supplier assuming that the 
customer bought its entire demand from the supplier and did not import anything or buy the 
good from a secondary producer. Because in practice most goods have number of secondary 
producers and the goods could also be imported, the value of RBI may exceed 100%. 
(5) 
    
                                  
                       
 
 
To make the comprehension of these two measures easier, an example is in order. If the total 
production of Industry C (customer) is $50bn and it buys $10bn of industry A’s (supplier) 
output then the RSI is $10bn/$50bn = 0.2 as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: RSI explained 
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Then again if the total production of Industry A is $200bn then the RBI is $10bn/$200bn = 
0.05 as demonstrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: RBI explained 
 
The real world interpretation of these numbers is as follows. RSI of 0.2 tells that in to produce 
$1 of output Industry C requires 20 cents of input from Industry A. The RBI value on the 
other hand tells how much of Industry A’s production is used by Industry C assuming 
Industry C buys all of its input from Industry A. So in this case 5% of Industry A’s production 
has the potential to be sold to the Industry C. 
It is also important to realize that RBI and RSI capture merely industry wide trading 
transactions and as such they say nothing about relationship specific assets or special 
circumstances discussed in sections 2.2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.2.4 concerning TCE and PRT. 
However, since positive non-zero values of RSI and RBI are prerequisite for a relationship 
implied by both TCE and PRT, then using them will include mergers relevant to TCE and 
PRC although it cannot distinguish them from the rest. 
In my study I am using the year 2002 Benchmark Accounts. The reason for using a one year’s 
accounts instead of matching the transaction with the corresponding year is dictated by 
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several reasons. First and most obvious one is that the benchmark accounts are produced only 
every five years and the most recent published one is year 2002 as the 2005 accounts are not 
published yet. Previous benchmark accounts that fall on my chosen time frame are 1997 and 
1992 but the use of only 2002 is preferred for the following reasons: 2002 splits my chosen 
time frame roughly in half, the 2002 already reasonably reflects the rise of IT industries at the 
turn of the millennia and the previous accounts do not use classification system consistent 
with each other’s. The use of single year accounts is likely to bias the results against finding a 
meaningful relationship since it has the potential of inducing noise to the sample. 
Because it is not immediately obvious which company is the supplier and which the customer 
without manually checking it, I have to calculate the RSI and RBI values for each transaction 
twice: in the first case assuming the acquirer is the supplier and in the second case assuming 
the acquirer is the customer. These two values are then used to determine the type of the 
vertical relationship (backward, forward and indeterminate) in the Section 4.2.3. 
 MERGER CLASSIFICATION 4.2.3
After obtaining and calculating the necessary variables it is time to classify the mergers in the 
sample and sort them into appropriate subsamples, namely horizontal, vertical backward, 
vertical forwards, vertical indeterminate and conglomerate mergers. The forward and 
backward mergers are self-evident but the reader may wonder what is meant by indeterminate 
vertical merger. This class of mergers arises because in real world some industries do not 
have ambiguous “direction”25 in flow of goods and it is those mergers that are to be classified 
into the vertical indeterminate group. Also, some vertical mergers are likely to have 
horizontal components and vice versa. 
In this thesis I am focusing on “pure” vertical mergers as the magnitude of the phenomenon I 
am studying is likely to be very low and introducing mixed merger types to the subsamples is 
likely to add noise to the results. For this reason the starting point of my classification is to 
first identify horizontal mergers and only then go through the remaining mergers looking for 
vertical relationship. Finally, once the vertical mergers have been identified and classified, the 
reminder of the sample is classified as conglomerate mergers. In the following sections I am 
going to explain how this was done. 
                                                 
25
 If an insurance company buys a bank, it is hard to say which one is the supplier and which one is the customer 
since they both use banking and insurance services. 
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4.2.3.1 IDENTIFYING HORIZONTAL MERGERS 
The standard approach in identifying horizontal mergers has been the use of SIC or more 
recently NAICS codes
26
. Typically the author of a study chooses a level of detail, say two, 
three or four first digits of the companies SIC or NAICS code and then checks if they match 
for the both companies. In principle any level of accuracy could be chosen and choosing more 
digits will make the horizontality criteria stricter. However, often it is not desirable to use five 
or six digit NAICS as that would classify a merger horizontal only if both the companies 
operated exactly in the same industry. In this study I use six-digit I/O code that roughly 
corresponds to a four-digit NAICS code.
27
 I compare the I/O codes of the acquirer and the 
target and if they are the same, the merger is considered to be horizontal. I do not wish to 
implement too harsh criteria on horizontal mergers since a merger of companies serving the 
same customer group could have entirely different solutions and offerings. For this reason I 
use the 6-digit I/O code as it gives flexibility in identifying vertical mergers. However, in 
unreported tabulation I find that using 4-digit NAICS codes instead does not significantly 
change the classification results. 
4.2.3.2 IDENTIFYING VERTICAL MERGERS 
The next step is to go through the remaining mergers and identify them as backward, forward 
or indeterminate. This is done based on the RBI and RSI values. A backward (forward) 
merger is a merger where the acquirer (target) buys more from the target (acquirer) than the 
target (acquirer) buys from the acquirer (target) and the target (acquirer) supplies more to the 
acquirer (target) than the acquirer supplies the target in terms of RSI and RBI values. 
(6) 
                                      {
          
          
 
                                     {
         
         
 
where 
                                                 
26
 For example see Chattarjee (1986) and Sudarsanam (1996) 
27
 For more information about the six-digit I/O coding system see Lawson (1997a). For comparison, I/O coding 
has roughly 400 entries whereas four-digit NAICS has roughly 300 entries. 
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RBIA = relative buyer importance assuming acquirer is the customer 
RBIT = relative buyer importance assuming target is the customer 
RSIA = relative supplier importance assuming acquirer is the supplier 
RSIT = relative supplier importance assuming the target is the supplier 
 
Note that this definition rules out the possibility of indeterminate vertical relationships where 
only one of the two mathematical conditions are met. The rest of the mergers with vertical 
component but indeterminate customer-supplier relationship are classified as indeterminate 
vertical mergers. The remaining mergers that do not fall into any of the previous categories 
are classified as pure conglomerate mergers. See the table below for the distribution of 
different merger types. 
Now the necessary work from the I/O tables is done and the data collected are merged with 
the market data in a database I constructed for this purpose. The RSI and RBI will be used in 
the regressions as the main variables of interest. In the next section I will discuss some 
problems and challenges associated with the I/O framework as well as justifying why using 
the US data on European markets should not largely matter. 
 THE CASE FOR USING THE US DATA 4.2.4
A reader might now wonder how valid could it be to use a US dataset in Europe. After all, 
those are two different geographical areas and completely separate administrative regions. If 
I/O information is so widely used across the industrialized world, why would I not use 
European data? Unfortunately, no unified I/O dataset with sufficient level of detail exists for 
the European Union. Tables produced by the Eurostat are not detailed enough for meaningful 
analysis of this sort as they track down commodities and industries with detail of some dozens 
industries and commodities. While some European countries, such as the UK and Germany, 
do produce their own national I/O data with great detail, processing and combining the data 
from these multiple sources would unfeasible. It would take years of work even from the 
Eurostat to produce that information, and yet it would yield only a marginally more accurate 
picture at best.  
The most comprehensive and readily available I/O dataset is the Benchmark Input-Output 
Accounts prepared by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). It is 
combination of multiple complementary sources such the Economic Census, the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Bureau of Labor yielding a rich and detailed picture of the material 
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flows in the US economy. The Benchmark Accounts are prepared every five years and 
together form a dataset that track the annual commodity input and output flows in the US 
economy. Despite the wealth of information in presented in the various tables I am only going 
to use for the purposes of this study two of them: the “Make” and “Use” tables. These tables 
distinguish between over 400 different industries and commodities classified by unique I/O 
code which neatly corresponds roughly to 4-digit NAICS codes (Ann M Lawson 1997a, Ann 
M Lawson 1997b). 
Before proceeding I feel the need to address potential concerns that could arise from using the 
US data. Although the European Union and the United States are roughly equal in size when 
measured by GDP, there could be differences in absolute and relative sizes of the different 
industries. While this is probably the case, it is very unlikely to greatly affect the data that we 
are interested in. To first address the absolute size difference question. The data we are after is 
the relative shares of different commodities used and supplied by different industries to each 
other. Suppose vertically trading industries A and B are only half of the size in Europe as they 
are in the US. Assuming everything else is unchanged, this does not affect the RSI and RBI 
which are fractions of the input and output flows. By this I mean that for example producing 1 
unit of bread requires 0.8 units of flour per 1 unit of bread irrespective of does the factory 
produce ten thousand units of bread or million units of bread. The question of relative size 
difference of industries is trickier. If significant differences existed, it would affect primarily 
RBI, not so much RSI. This is because if the customer industry is smaller, it will scale down 
its purchases in relation to its output. However, RBI does not work the same way. If the 
customer industry is relatively speaking smaller than the supplier industry, the RBI value 
diminishes. 
Do we then have reasons to believe that such large relative differences should exist and are 
there any reasons to believe that such differences are not likely to be large? When a firm, and 
in a larger scale industry, makes a production and investment decisions they are affected 
largely affected by 4 different factors. The first factor is available production technology and 
it could affect the production decision in three ways. First, it could permit production of a 
commodity that could not otherwise be produced, such as CPUs or other high tech 
commodities. Most developing countries lack the production technology necessary to make 
such sophisticated products. Second, it could permit use of alternative input materials to make 
the same output. A good example is the case of fuels. Diesel and gasoline can be either 
extracted from crude oil in classical distillation process or converted from coal with Fischer-
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Tropsch synthesis. Third, technology could allow more efficient use of raw materials reducing 
the consumption of one or more input materials which could alter the input coefficients of the 
producer. For example, fuel efficient engines and energy saving measures could mean that 
less fuel and electricity are needed per production unit to produce one unit of final product. 
Question is now, are there likely to be large differences in overall level of technology in the 
US and Europe. This is clearly not the case. Technology and innovations dissipate fairly 
quickly across the Atlantic. The internet, social and community networks and multinational 
corporations ensure that innovations affecting entire industries cannot be contained just to the 
one side of the ocean. 
The second factor that could affect the commodity flows is the substitutability of inputs and 
their relative prices. For instance, industrial grade alcohol can be fermented from multiple 
different crops such sugar cane, corn, potatoes or fruits. A potential distortion could arise if, 
say, in the US alcohol was primarily made from corn because of its relative cheapness in the 
US while in Europe the primary raw material was barley or other grain crop. Using the US 
data would overestimate the importance of corn producers and downplay the importance of 
grain producers to alcohol industry. However, this is unlikely to be major concern for the 
purpose of this analysis as only very few products can fully substitute an input with another 
input from a completely different industry, in this case corn and grain producers are both 
under the same I/O producing industry. In any case, most traded commodities are globally 
traded and the prices of such commodities should be roughly the same irrespective of the 
country where you buy them. However, geographical differences and transport costs could 
cause the prices of these inputs to differ in the two markets and consequently distort the 
relative prices of the commodity inputs. This in turn can affect companies’ production 
decisions in some cases. However, large geographical representation in the US and Europe is 
likely to average out these differences since they are expected to be regionally present in both 
markets. 
The third factor is legislation and institutions in the country. Availability of credit and 
enforcement of contracts can influence industrial organization of the country which in turn 
could affect the investment decisions. However, broadly speaking the legal systems of Europe 
and the US are well developed, contracts are enforced by courts and financial systems are 
advanced. 
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All in all, since the economic and industrial structure of the US and Western Europe are fairly 
similar, it is reasonable to use the US tables as a proxy for measuring the industrial level 
bargaining power in Europe as well. Past studies suggest that industrial concentration is 
indeed very similar between the industrialized countries, largely because of technological 
factors (Simpson, Tsukui 1965). Similar language speaks studies that compare concentration 
ratios between countries: some small individual differences are sure to exist but all in all the 
US and Europe are fairly similar in terms of market structure Pryor (1972). Any deviances are 
likely to be small and their impact on the analysis is just to add more noise to results biasing 
against finding any significant relationship from the data. 
Considering everything that has been said in this subsection, the use of US data is unlikely 
have large impact on the results and any distortion is likely to only bias against finding 
significant relationship rather than the other way around. Furthermore, use of the US data is 
likely to improve cross country comparability of my results to Ahern’s results (2012) because 
according to Simpson and Tsukui (1965), cosmetic differences between countries in I/O 
tables exist but they are more of a result of different standards in reporting than actual 
differences in underlying relations. Use of same reporting standard as input for constructing 
the variables is therefore likely to improve validity of comparison between the two studies. 
 LIMITATIONS OF I/O CLASSIFICATION 4.2.5
To identify supplier-customer relations in the merger sample, the company NAICS codes 
need to be converted to I/O codes and matched in the I/O tables by finding if the industries 
where the companies belong to trade. Theoretically, all industries that use industry A’s output 
are customers to the industry A and the industry A is their supplier. However, this line of 
thinking raises a few problems with the real life data on two issues. 
The first issue is that some inputs are clearly not significant in dollar terms to likely justify an 
acquisition of their supplier or customer. For example, retail stores buy plastic bags from the 
plastic bag industry but the overall value of those purchases is very low. It seems unlikely that 
a merger between a retail store chain and a plastic bag maker is due to retail store wanting to 
secure its supply of plastic bags or plastic bag maker wanting to secure a customer. 
The second problem is that some industries use output of their customers to produce their own 
output. For example, insurance companies buy banking services from the banks while banks 
buy insurance. In this case, it is unclear which one is the ultimate supplier and which one is 
the ultimate customer. Similar problem is present with machine tool industry and steel making 
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industry; they both buy the output of the other. This creates indeterminate vertical 
relationships where it is very difficult to say which way the relationship actually goes. 
Third issue is the drawing of line between a horizontal merger and a vertical merger. In 
practice classification of mergers is not as clear-cut as in theory. Sometimes horizontal 
mergers have vertical components and vice versa. For example, suppose a gas field owner 
purchases an oil refiner. Most gas fields produce some amounts of crude oil that is sold to 
refineries as a by-product. On the other hand, the gas field operator is in business of selling 
energy. To certain degree natural gas and oil are each other’s substitutes. Should this merger 
be classified as a horizontal merger with vertical component or vertical merger with 
horizontal component? In unreported assessment I find that significant proportion of the 
horizontal mergers have vertical component of some degree, sometimes even as high as 30% 
as measured in RSI and RBI. 
Finally, the way I/O collapses industries into larger classes tends to overestimate the 
proportion of horizontal mergers as companies that operate in industries that are very close to 
each other in supply chain are classified in I/O system as the same industry. Trade between 
these two separate NAICS industries is in I/O system recorded as input that originates from 
the industry itself (auto consumption). Auto consumption means the proportion of an 
industry’s output that is used as input to produce the output. For example, the final output of 
grain farming is grain seeds; however, a proportion of this output is saved and used the next 
year in planting the crop. Another example is “Coated and Laminated Packaging Paper and 
Plastics Film Manufacturing” (NAICS code 322221). This industry produces plastic wrapping 
that is wrapped around piled boxes to keep them together. Naturally, the output is delivered in 
packages that are wrapped around the same plastic produced by the factory itself. These two 
examples represent the genuine auto consumption. But a company that produces parts to a 
headlight that will be used in a car is likely to be classified into the same group as the 
assembler of the headlight. This relationship is not auto consumption but is counted as such in 
the I/O tabulation. Thus, in reality the “auto consumption” figures provided by the I/O tables 
are inflated as they mix genuine auto consumption and the production that originates from 
two different NAICS industries but is classified as one in I/O system. While this is a problem, 
its scale is likely to remain low: the example presented before is most relevant for very small 
companies specializing on very specific products but those same companies are most likely 
not public companies anyway and would not be included in this sample anyway. This issue is 
75 
 
not likely to significantly bias the results and any such bias is going to make finding 
significant results more difficult. 
Now that I have gone through the most important variables in my study, namely the division 
of gains and the vertical dependency variables, it is time to move on to describe the event 
study methodology in greater detail. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to explaining what 
are event studies, what kind of event study I utilize and how the data collected in the event 
study are analyzed. 
4.3 EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY 
Event study methodology is probably the most utilized tool in corporate finance being in use 
since Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (FFJR) (1969) published their classical article where they 
tested the stock market’s reaction to stock splits. Since then it has become the statistical 
method of choice to assess the impact of an event to the value of the company or its rivals. 
The key idea of the method is that in absence of news or new information affecting the value 
of the company, individual stock price movements are more or less random co-movement 
with wider market movements. Assuming that markets are semi-strongly efficient, arrival of 
new information regarding the company would induce a non-random component to the stock 
price on the day of the event. This allows us to separate impact of the event from the 
“normal” or the “background noise” of the stock price movements. The event study is 
particularly suited for cases in which the event date can be clearly identified permitting use of 
short event windows. The general structure of any event study is as follows: 
1. Defining event and event window 
2. Estimating normal returns 
3. Measuring and cumulating abnormal returns 
4. Testing of results 
 DEFINING EVENT AND EVENT WINDOW 4.3.1
The first step in any event study is to define the event and identify the time frame (event 
window) when the impact of the event is presumed to be detectable. The theoretically correct 
event is the moment in time when the proposed merger is first publically announced. The EU 
law requires that the company has to release information relevant to the company’s 
performance so that every investor has the chance to receive it at the same time. In most cases 
this refers to the moment in time when relevant paper work is filed to either to the relevant 
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authorities or the stock exchange in the country in question. For this thesis I use the 
announcement dates provided by SDC International Mergers database. Only the dates which 
are not marked to be estimates of the true date announced are included into the sample. 
Because it is possible that some of the information is leaked to the markets immediately 
before the announcement I will define the event window to start one trading day before the 
announcement. Because it is possible that the announcement is given on a non-trading day or 
after the closing of the trading on the event date, I will expand the event window to the end of 
the following trading day to give enough time to the markets to react to the new information. 
Thus the event window becomes in terms of trading days: 
(7) 
                       
 
 ESTIMATING NORMAL RETURNS 4.3.2
The second step is to estimate the normal returns for each stock. Multiple options exist in 
choice of estimation technique which can be classified either as statistical models or 
economic models (MacKinlay 1997). The simplest statistical method is the Constant Mean 
Return Model (CMRM) which is a simple statistical technique which relies on the assumption 
that stock price changes are normally distributed. The idea is to look for deviations 
sufficiently large from the expected value of the stock to detect abnormal returns. The main 
drawback of the approach is that it does not capture the obvious covariance between the stock 
and broader market. For this reason the results from CMRM have more noise in them than 
those that explicitly address the covariance issue. While arguably the simplest and least 
sophisticated method available it, perhaps surprisingly, yields almost equally good –or even 
better– results than more sophisticated methods (Brown, Warner 1980). 
Another statistical method, which is presently perhaps the most popular one, is the Market 
Model approach. It is a statistical model that closely resembles the Capital Asset Pricing 
model (CAPM). In market model the normal return for the stock is estimated based on a 
univariate regression where the stock return is explained by the market return. The coefficient 
corresponds to the beta and intercept corresponds to risk-free rate in the CAPM. The 
advantage of market model is that it takes into account the covariance between the market and 
the stock as well as capturing the normal random variation of the stock. Disadvantage of the 
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method is that it is only weakly supported by economic theory and relies on a set of restrictive 
statistical assumptions. Furthermore, more information is required to calculate the market 
model estimates for the normal return than in CMRM. 
In addition to already presented statistical models, a few economic models exist as well. Of 
those, the CAPM based approach was very popular during the 1970s. Since then considerable 
evidence against the validity of CAPM has mounted which has lead into CAPM falling out of 
favor in favor of the market model. Other economic models include the Fama and French 
three factor model and a model based on Arbitrage Pricing Theory by Stephen Ross. Fama 
and French model has seen some use in finance research, including in Ahern (2012). 
However, compared to the market model the three factor requires sorting of the market 
securities according to their size and book-to-market ratio. This makes it more data intensive 
than market model or CAPM (MacKinlay 1997). 
For this study I have opted for using the market model due to its relative simplicity in data 
requirements. The three factor model was also considered but eventually abandoned since it 
requires far more data to be collected and processed and in the end it is not clear does it 
provide any clear advantages over simpler methods. In similar study Ahern (2012) found that 
the results of the analysis are virtually unchanged irrespective if market model or more 
sophisticated Fama and French model was used. 
The establishment of appropriate estimation window for the normal return is the next step. 
The window needs to be sufficiently long to yield robust estimates, it has to be sufficiently far 
apart from the event date to prevent any possible pre-merger information leaks from affecting 
it and yet it has to be sufficiently recent to make sure the risk profile and the expected return 
of the stock not to change. Following Ahern (2012) I establish estimation window to start 270 
calendar days before the event date and then counting forward 174 trading days. Since the 
sample represents a wide array of companies traded in various countries, the benchmark index 
used in estimation depends on the company and its listing country. Thorough list of indexes 
used for each country is in the Appendix C. As a main rule I either use the official general 
index for the stock exchange or then another index that seeks to track the market movements. 
The index value data were retrieved from Thomson DataStream. 
I retrieve daily compounded total return data from the Thomson One Banker database. As the 
name suggests these returns are adjusted for dividends, stock splits and other factors that do 
not affect the value of the return for the holder but do affect the stock price. Furthermore, the 
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returns are not continuously compounded so I converted them from daily compounded to 
continuous compounding using Equation 8. The conversion into continuous compounding is 
done because when using compounded returns the changes of same magnitude in stock price 
in opposite directions do not cancel out each other. For example, -10% and 10% in 
consequent days do not result in  net change of 0% which the average of these two numbers 
suggests but instead results in a net change of -1%. This problem disappears if continuously 
compounded returns are used. 
(8) 
             
where 
Rcc = continuously compounded daily total return 
Rd = daily compounded total return 
This conversion is done to all data that are used in this study. From now on, all return data 
used in the equations are continuously compounded. 
The abnormal daily return is then calculated by subtracting the market model predicted 
normal returns from the continuously compounded actual daily returns. The returns are then 
cumulated as demonstrated in the following section. The cumulative excess returns of the 
three-day window are then multiplied by the market cap of the company at the start of the 
three-day window to get the returns in dollar terms. 
The parameters for calculating the normal returns are estimated using the market model from 
the 175 trading days in the estimation window. The estimation is done running a regression in 
Equation 9. 
(9) 
                 
where 
Rit = observed return for stock i for day t 
αi = estimated intercept for market model regression for stock i 
βi = estimated coefficient for market model regression for stock i 
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Rmt = observed return for associated market index for stock i for day t 
εit = error term for stock i for day t 
 MEASURING AND CUMULATING ABNORMAL RETURNS 4.3.3
Using the parameters from the market model estimation of the normal returns, the abnormal 
return ARit for each day of the event window is calculated using Equation 10. 
(10) 
                        
where 
ARit = abnormal return for stock i for day t 
The abnormal returns are then cumulated over the three-day window using Equation 11 
below. 
(11) 
     ∑     
 
    
 
where 
CARi = cumulative abnormal return for period t (in case of this study this is three days) 
The CAR calculated this way are then used to calculate the cumulative abnormal euro return 
($CAR) according to formula below. 
(12) 
              
     
where 
MVEi,t = market value of equity of company i at time t, which in this case is the beginning of 
the event window 
From $CARs of both companies I calculate ∆$CAR as the dependent variable for the 
regression. Calculation for ∆$CAR is reproduced below for reader’s convenience. 
80 
 
(13) 
      
           
         
 
where 
$CARA = cumulative abnormal euro return of the acquirer 
$CART = cumulative abnormal euro return of the target 
MVEA = market value of equity of the acquirer 
MVET = market value of equity of the target 
In the subsample where both companies have positive gains I use the intuitive “splitting the 
pie” approach for quantifying the division. See the following equation. 
(14) 
    
     
           
 
where 
Ω% = the target’s percentage share of total gains when both companies have positive returns 
I have now explained the construction of the dependent variable and the two independent 
variables of interest, namely RBI and RSI. Next I will introduce a set of control variables that 
are used or should be used in the study. 
 CONTROL VARIABLES 4.3.4
Division of gains is likely to be determined by multiple factors rather than mere RSI and RBI 
which are only proxies for dependence – not dependency variables. The I/O tables measure 
commodity flows, not degree of dependency. Although a large volume of trade surely is an 
important factor creating dependency, any bargaining power arising merely from asymmetries 
in existing trade arrangements can be negated if suppliers and customers are easily 
substituted. For example, if the input is a uniform commodity traded in an exchange, finding a 
replacement should not be an issue. On the other hand if the input is tailor-made to the 
customer’s needs by a patent holder changing can be next to impossible. Unfortunately, I do 
not have any direct measurements of substitutability as the direct measure would require 
measuring the marginal rate of technical substitution between all inputs in all industries which 
81 
 
of course is in practice impossible. Instead I will use a set of proxies that capture different 
aspects of substitutability. 
First, I include the price-cost margin (PCM) of both companies to account for the scarcity of 
the product at the company level. PCM is calculated as the sales minus the cost of goods sold 
(COGS) minus general and administrative costs (SGA) divided by sales. 
(15) 
    
              
     
 
 
If COGS or SGA are unavailable I use operating income before depreciation, interest and 
taxes divided by sales. Price-cost margin measures company’s ability to price above marginal 
cost and higher values indicate larger ability to do that. While high values could indicate low 
substitutability it is also possible that the industry itself is capital intensive and exclusion of 
depreciation is the reason for the high value. I take also a similar measure on the 6-digit I/O 
industry level (industry profit divided by industry sales) and add it to the regression to 
account for scarcity of the output on the industrial level. Greater values of industry profit 
suggest that the industry’s products do not have good substitutes and hence more difficult it is 
for a customer to find an alternative supplier. 
Company’s products might also be hard to substitute due to the heterogeneity of the product 
market. For example, Apple computers have products that not only command brand premium 
but are also difficult to switch from since they do not follow the standards prevailing in the 
PC industry. To take this into consideration I could compute the standard deviation within 
each company’s industry, however, due to resource constraints I was unable to do this. Ahern 
used this measure in his study but found it to have small values and statistical insignificance. 
Industry concentration is an alternative measure to proxy for the difficulty of changing a 
customer or a supplier within an industry. Industry concentration is a measure of pricing 
power of individual companies within an industry. It can be measured using concentration 
ratios which indicate how large fraction of the industry sales is concentrated to X number of 
companies. The US Economic Census provides concentration ratios for nearly all NAICS 
code industries in the US. Unfortunately similar database does not exist for Europe. Not all 
EU members publish such information and even those who do, often only in their own native 
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language. However, there are two possibilities to partially circumvent the lack of European 
data. 
The first option is to use the US Economic Census data provided by the US Census Bureau. 
As with the I/O tables, the fundamental economic structure of the Western Europe and the 
USA is rather similar leading most likely into same kind of industry outcomes. Although 
comparative studies between the market structure as measured by concentration ratios are not 
very common, a study by Pryor (1972) suggest that industry concentration in the US and in 
the Europe are strikingly similar. This is not a surprising finding considering that 
technological and institutional factors and market size are prime drivers of industry 
concentration as suggested by Porter (1979). Other studies also make comparative references 
to the industrial concentration between the two markets among others Curry and George 
(1983) and Lyons et al. (2001) which suggest the same as Pryor’s study. Capital intensive 
industries tend to be much more concentrated than labor intensive industries for the reason 
that large initial capital outlays constitute a barrier to entry. Europe and the US are very 
similar in terms of technological advancement, societal structure and institutions and thus it is 
hardly surprising that the industry structure between the two regions is fairly similar. 
The second option is that I could use self-compiled industry concentration data from 
Thomson One Banker or similar database. However, the problem with that approach is that 
the data coverage and quality in the Thomson One Banker are likely to be poor and take 
considerable effort to compile at sufficient detail. Many medium to small businesses do not 
have their financial statements available in Thomson. Utilizing this method would therefore 
induce an upward bias in the market concentration calculations. 
From the two approaches the first one seems to be more accurate proxy for the industry 
concentration in the target area. Although it has its shortcomings it is likely to be better than 
the alternative or nothing. Therefore, the industry concentration ratios of the acquirer and the 
target will be included into the analysis. The industry of the company is defined to be the first 
4-digits of the company’s NAICS code and the concentration ratio used is “the 8 largest 
firms” level. I use the concentration ratios for year 2002. 
Third, companies with scarcer assets should theoretically have higher Market-to-Book ratios 
(M/B) which could indicate, among other things, how much bargaining power the company 
has. However, I am fully aware that M/B also has number of other interpretations, such as a 
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sign of overvaluation or growth prospects. Despite this caveat I will include it in the 
regression as I feel that leaving it out would be a greater evil. 
There are also a set of other variables that have been found to impact returns and 
consequently they could also affect distribution of gains in mergers that are not directly linked 
to industrial relations. For ensuring that any potential results do not arise because of one these 
issues, as a robustness check it should be investigated if they have any impact on the results. 
Unfortunately, unavailability of data prevents proper checking of most of these variables but I 
will briefly mention some of these issues so that the reader is aware of them. 
In some mergers targets set themselves a termination fee for negotiation strategy purposes. 
How this works is that in case they fail to consummate the merger after certain point in time 
they have to pay a termination fee to the acquirer as compensation. Theoretically this could 
lead into more aggressive bidding in competitive situations and could thus increase the 
bargaining power of the targets. There is some evidence to support this view (Officer 2003, 
Hotchkiss, Qian & Song 2005). Form of payment has been demonstrated to affect returns in 
mergers (Kaufman 1988). Paying with stock has been observed to be associated with lower 
returns compared to cash and asset payments. Although in the spirit of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) form of payment should not matter in absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, frictions and 
agency costs, there are other reasons which mean that form of payment can matter. For 
example, offering stock payment instead of cash would be preferable to management that 
perceives its shares overvalued. If the management has superior information compared to 
markets rational investors could take stock payment as a signal of overvaluation. To account 
for the form of payment a dummy should be included into the regression equation. However, 
the SDC’s data on form of payment are missing for many observations and due to this was not 
included. 
There are also other possible variables that could drive the division of gains including such as 
the use of merger advisers, form of payment, use of defense tactics and such things. Data 
availability permitting, these are included in the regressions run, however, the reliability and 
availability of most of these data are questionable at best. 
Unlike Ahern’s, my sample contains fair amount of cross-border mergers. This can have 
impact on the results as international mergers often involve considerable institutional, cultural 
and legal barriers that could mean that the subsample of international mergers has already 
been through an implicit self-selection. It is also possible that cognitive biases cause managers 
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to favor domestic companies in mergers in a similar way that has been hypothesized to 
happen with the equity home bias puzzle.
28
 Based on the proportion of international mergers 
in my sample it is clear that domestic mergers are highly overrepresented if the relative sizes 
of the economies within the sample countries are used as benchmark. To account for 
possibility that international mergers somehow affect division of gains I add dummy variable 
that takes value one if the two companies are headquartered in different countries and zero 
otherwise. 
Absolute size or size difference between the companies might also be an explanatory factor. 
For example, it has been observed that merger returns are affected by so called “size effect” 
(Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz 2004). In practice this means that large mergers tend to fare 
worse than small mergers. This could also plausibly affect division of gains in mergers. 
Another size related variable that could be important is the size difference between the parties. 
The larger party could use its greater size as leverage in negotiations the same way that states 
use their size as leverage. To capture the impact of size I include the natural logarithms of the 
market values of equity of the both companies. To account for difference in size I add a 
relative size measure which is the market value of acquirer’s equity divided by the market 
value of the target’s equity. 
Of all of these potential influential factors discussed above only measures of size and 
internationality are included in the final regressions. This was done mainly because data 
limitations regarding the other variables. In many cases too much data were missing, marked 
as unknown or there was considerable ambiguity how to include the data into the regression.
29
 
Despite these limitations I believe that exclusion of these variables is unlikely to bias the 
results. I base this partially on observations from previous studies. For example, in his study 
Ahern did not find any of the issues mentioned in this robustness checks section significant to 
the results. It seems unlikely that these factors would be any more important in European 
setting than in the US setting. 
                                                 
28
 For more about investor equity home bias puzzle, see French and Poterba (1991). 
29
 For example, in many cases the payment form was hybrid consisting of stock, cash and an unknown 
component. 
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 REGRESSIONS AND REGRESSION VARIABLES 4.3.5
Perhaps the most utilized way to investigate relationships between different variables in social 
sciences is to use regression analysis. In principle the specification of the actual model 
depends on the a priori assumptions about the form of the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables. Although modern computing enables the use of both linear and 
non-linear models, in practice non-linear models are rarely utilized unless there are strong a 
priori reasons to specify a non-linear model, for example prediction by the economic theory 
of the form or shape of the relationship. In this case I believe that the probable relationship 
between RSI, RBI and ∆$CAR is probably non-linear which is the case with many real world 
phenomena. However, I cannot say is that relationship likely to be logarithmic, exponential, 
polynomial or something else. For this reason I opt for using the standard OSL model. 
OLS regression is run to assess if the product market relationship has impact on the 
distribution of gains in the vertical mergers in different vertical subtypes. The dependent 
variable in these regressions is either ∆$CAR (included in all samples) or Ω%
30
(positive 
returns subsample). The independent variables or the variables that seek to explain the 
variation in the dependent variable are listed below. They include the variables of interest as 
well as a set of control variables. For reader’s convenience the definition of each variable is 
included although all the variables have been defined in the preceding sections. 
 
The regression equation for all samples utilizing ∆$CAR 
(16) 
                                                     
                                          
where 
α = intercept 
RBI = relative supplier importance 
RSI = relative buyer importance 
MB = market to book ratio 
                                                 
30
 Ω% is the target’s percentage share of total gains when both companies have positive returns. 
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P% = price-cost margin 
Ψ8 = concentration ratio of 8 largest firms 
IG% = industry gross margin 
ME = logarithm of market value of equity 50 days prior to merger announcement 
S = size difference between the acquirer and the target 
I = international dummy 
ε = error term 
Lower index “A” indicates acquirer while “T” indicates target 
The regression equation for strictly positive returns subsample utilizing Ω% 
(17) 
                                                  
                                          
where 
Ω% = target’s percentage fraction of total gains 
Relative Buyer Importance (RBI): This variable proxies the customer’s importance to the 
supplier. It is counted from I/O tables using the formula below. Its economic interpretation is 
the customer share of the supplier’s total output. Theoretical minimum value is 0% while 
upper limit can be higher than 100%. This is because customer industry’s consumption can 
exceed the production capacity of the supplying industry. The shortfall is covered by imports 
and secondary production of other industries. 
(18) 
    
                                  
                       
 
 
The expected sign of this variable depends on the direction of the vertical relationship. In 
forward mergers it is expected that the sign is positive. The more dependent the supplier-
acquirer is of the customer-target, the more bargaining power the target has over the acquirer. 
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In backward mergers the relation is reversed and the sign coefficient is expected to be 
negative. 
Relative Supplier Importance (RSI) This variable proxies the supplier’s importance to the 
customer. It is calculated from the I/O tables by dividing the input from the supplier by the 
total output of the customer. The possible band for this variable is from 0% to 100%. 
(19) 
    
                                      
                            
 
 
The expected sign for RSI is positive for backward mergers. The more dependent the 
customer-acquirer is of the supplier-target, the more bargaining power the target is expected 
to have. In forward mergers the sign of the coefficient is reversed to negative. 
Concentration ratio of 8 largest firms (Ψ8A and Ψ8T) The 8 firm concentration ratio proxies 
the market power of the company. More concentrated the market more difficult it is for the 
other party to find an alternative supplier or customer. In the regressions two variables are 
included: the concentration ratio for the target and the concentration ratio for the acquirer. The 
expected sign of target concentration ratio is positive while the target concentration ratio is 
negative. Concentration ratio is calculated as indicated below. 
 
(20) 
    
∑          
 
   
∑          
 
   
 
                                                     
Price-Cost Margin (P%A and P%T) Higher PCM could indicate that a company can price 
above its marginal cost because its product is somehow scarce. Scarcity gives bargaining 
power so the expected sign of this variable is positive for the target and negative for the 
acquirer. 
Market-to-Book ratio (MBA and MBT) The same logic that applies to market concentration 
applies to MB-ratio. Assuming that higher MB ratio reflected higher bargaining power, the 
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MB ratio of target would have positive coefficient while the acquirer’s negative. However, it 
is important to realize that in practice M/B has multiple interpretations and the coefficient 
could be different for these reasons. 
Industry gross margin (IG%A and IG%T) Industry gross margin measures the pricing 
power of the entire industry. Higher margins would indicate industry with pricing power of its 
products arising from scarcity for substitutes. Acquirer industry would have negative 
coefficient while target’s is expected to have positive. 
Market Value of Equity (MEA and MET) It could be that the size of the merger is affecting 
the merger outcome as suggested by Dimson and Marsh (1986) and Moeller et al. (2004). 
Both studies find that large companies tend to perform worse than small and medium 
companies in stock markets and in mergers respectively. To control for this I include 
logarithm of the market value of the acquirer and the target 50 days before the announcement 
date. 
Relative size (S) measures the size difference between the companies and it is calculated by 
dividing the size of the acquirer by the size of the target to get their relative size. This variable 
is expected to have negative coefficient as increasing size of the acquirer is likely to mean 
larger acquirer bargaining power and consequently smaller target gains. 
International merger (I) is a dummy variable that gets value of one if the target and acquirer 
are from different countries, otherwise zero.  
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Horizontal 
45 % 
Conglomerate 
12 % 
Backward 
17 % 
Forward 
19 % 
Indeterminate 
7 % 
Merger types in the sample 
5 RESULTS 
In this chapter I will first present the summary statistics of the sample before proceeding to 
the main results. The properties of the sample with respect to merger returns are well in line 
with existing literature with a few minor diffractions. Overall there is little evidence in 
support of the notion that product market dependencies create bargaining power for either 
party. Statistically and economically significant relation was found in forward mergers in 
subsample where both companies have positive returns for RBI and regression coefficients 
have mostly expected signs. Although findings are generally in contrast with Ahern (2012) it 
is possible that the lack of evidence is due to too small sample size and noisy data.  
5.1 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of different types of mergers. Horizontal mergers form the 
single largest group with 45% but vertically related mergers are almost as numerous with 43% 
share. As a side note of the vertical mergers roughly 40% would have been classified as 
conglomerate merger if only NAICS had been used for identification. This raises questions 
about the need to update the results of empirical studies utilizing SIC/NAICS for identifying 
related or conglomerate mergers. 
Table 2 presents cumulative 
abnormal returns in which 
returns of the target and the 
acquirer are weighted by their 
market capitalization. As far 
as I know, no other study has 
examined returns between 
different merger types in 
Europe. From here we learn 
that average merger increases 
the value of the merged firm 
by on average 1.02%. This 
value is statistically highly 
significant with t-value 5.23. In 
practice this number means that 
Figure 7: Proportions of different merger types in the sample 
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if we chose a merger at random and invested an equal amount of money to both companies, 
the expected return to our total investment is 1.02%. When examined by merger type 
considerable differences start to emerge. Of the major classes of mergers, conglomerate 
mergers are the most profitable with 1.42% average cumulative abnormal return over the 
three-day event window and horizontal mergers are the least profitable with only 0.83% 
return. Closer examination reveals large variation within vertical mergers. Backward mergers 
actually destroy combined shareholder value on average by -0.54%. This is largely because of 
losses realized by the acquirers but even the target performance seems worse compared to the 
acquirers in other types of mergers. Mergers with no ambiguous vertical relationship appear 
the most profitable type of mergers but the difference to forward mergers is not statistically 
significant. 
Table 2: Average weighted cumulative abnormal return for each merger 
Panel A: Average of weighted CAR             
Sample µ (%)   σ (%)   
Min 
(%) 
Max 
(%)   Median N 
                        
All Mergers 1.02   6.11   -50.2 36.80   0.01 798 
  Horizontal 0.83   6.09   -17.6 36.80   0.31 358 
  Conglomerate 1.42   5.46   -13.6 24.30   0.88 92 
  Vertical 0.84   6.46   -50.2 33.30   0.46 348 
    Backward -0.54   6.42   -50.2 20.40   0.05 139 
    Forward 1.31   5.14   -15.5 26.70   0.91 149 
    Indeterminate 2.82   6.66   -10.6 33.30   1.12 60 
Panel B: Average of weighted CAR when both companies have positive returns 
Sample µ (%)   σ (%)   
Min 
(%) 
Max 
(%)   Median N 
                        
All Mergers 5.42   5.53   0.09 36.8   3.92 264 
  Horizontal 5.81   5.67   0.19 36.80   4.40 117 
  Conglomerate 4.67   4.66   0.12 22.90   3.09 29 
  Vertical 5.22   5.58   0.09 24.40   3.69 118 
    Backward 5.45   5.66   0.09 24.3   3.92 42 
    Forward 5.03   5.70   0.46 33.30   3.50 52 
    Indefinite 5.20   5.37   0.36 24.4   3.39 24 
 
Examination of acquirer CARs and target CARs in Table 3 reveals a familiar pattern in which 
acquirers’ returns are negative or zero while targets’ gain. Only the returns of backward 
mergers are significantly different from zero. Dollar returns of the sample are negative 
indicating presence of size effect [Moeller et al. (2004)] or in other word that there are large 
deals which bring the total dollar returns of the sample negative. For this reason only looking 
at the percentage returns is misleading. 
91 
 
Table 3: Average cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers and targets 
Panel A: Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)                 
                    Percentile (%)     
Sample µ (%)   σ (%)   Min (%) Max (%)   10th 25th 50th 75th 90th   N 
All Mergers -0.5   8.0   -151.1 29.4   -6.2 -2.6 -0.1 2.5 5.6   798 
  Horizontal -0.5   6.1   -25.9 25.6   -7.0 -2.6 -0.3 2.1 5.8   358 
  Conglomerate -0.6   4.8   -19.5 14.1   -6.1 -2.9 -0.2 2.1 5.5   92 
  Vertical -0.4   10.1   -151.1 29.4   -6.0 -2.5 0.1 2.9 5.3   348 
    Backward -1.7   14.3   -151.1 21.8   -9.3 -2.5 -0.1 2.8 5.2   139 
    Forward 0.3   5.2   -15.8 29.4   -5.5 -2.5 0.2 2.4 4.2   149 
    Indefinite 1.1   7.0   -17.9 22.5   -8.3 -2.1 0.6 3.4 10.1   60 
Panel B: Target Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)                   
                    Percentile (%)     
Sample µ (%)   σ (%)   Min (%) Max (%)   10th 25th 50th 75th 90th   N 
All Mergers 5.3   12.8   -52.5 102.7   -4.2 -1.0 1.7 8.1 20.6   798 
  Horizontal 5.1   12.0   -25.1 86.3   -4.2 -0.7 2.1 8.1 18.5   358 
  Conglomerate 4.8   11.0   -14.0 45.1   -3.0 -0.9 0.9 5.8 19.8   92 
  Vertical 5.5   14.0   -52.5 102.7   -4.5 -1.1 1.8 8.8 23.1   348 
    Backward 3.7   12.1   -36.2 69.4   -5.9 -1.4 1.3 5.5 19.2   139 
    Forward 6.5   14.3   -52.5 67.9   -3.3 -0.8 2.8 9.1 24.9   149 
    Indefinite 7.4   16.9   -19.4 102.7   -5.6 -0.5 1.9 13.6 25.8   60 
Panel C: Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) when both companies have positive returns     
                    Percentile (%)     
Sample µ (%)   σ (%)   Min (%) Max (%)   10th 25th 50th 75th 90th   N 
All Mergers 4.2   4.5   0.0 29.4   0.4 1.2 2.9 5.3 9.6   264 
  Horizontal 4.5   4.5   0.0 25.6   0.5 1.1 3.0 6.4 10.5   117 
  Conglomerate 3.3   3.2   0.1 14.1   0.4 0.7 2.6 4.7 7.2   29 
  Vertical 4.1   4.7   0.0 29.4   0.4 1.4 2.9 4.7 8.6   118 
    Backward 4.0   4.1   0.0 21.8   0.3 1.5 3.0 5.1 7.5   42 
    Forward 4.1   5.3   0.2 29.4   0.5 1.4 2.8 4.1 8.7   52 
    Indefinite 4.4   4.4   0.3 19.8   0.4 1.2 3.2 6.5 10.3   24 
Panel D: Target Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) when both companies have positive returns       
                    Percentile (%)     
Sample µ (%)   σ (%)   Min (%) Max (%)   10th 25th 50th 75th 90th   N 
All Mergers 9.6   12.3   0.0 102.7   0.9 1.8 5.3 12.3 25.5   264 
  Horizontal 8.8   10.1   0.0 56.9   0.9 1.9 5.7 10.3 23.8   117 
  Conglomerate 9.4   11.3   0.2 45.1   0.3 1.2 3.9 15.6 25.2   29 
  Vertical 10.5   14.5   0.0 102.7   1.0 1.8 4.6 12.6 31.7   118 
    Backward 8.2   10.4   0.0 49.2   0.6 1.4 3.7 12.4 23.9   42 
    Forward 11.5   13.5   0.0 57.8   1.0 2.0 5.5 18.3 34.8   52 
    Indefinite 12.2   21.4   0.4 102.7   0.8 1.7 3.9 15.1 29.7   24 
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5.2 MAIN RESULTS ON DIVISION OF GAINS 
In this section I explore the question do vertical relationships explain division of gains. Before 
going through the regression results I first examine are there significant differences in 
division of gains between different merger classes. Since it is likely that agency motives are 
present in the general sample in addition to the main sample I also examine a subsample 
where both companies have positive returns. The presence of agency motives is a distorting 
factor that cannot be easily accounted by any easy proxy variable and thus the positive returns 
subsample can provide better results. However, selection based on positive returns subjects 
the sample to potential selection bias which needs to be accounted for. Procedure to do this is 
proposed and briefly explained. 
 DIVISION OF GAINS IN EUROPEAN MERGERS 5.2.1
Table 4 summarizes the division of gains across the entire sample and the type specific 
subsamples. From panel A we can see that across all mergers the target gains (∆$CAR) on 
average 1.56 cents per dollar of pre-merger combined equity of the acquirer and target more 
than the acquirers. Standard deviation of this value is 5.71 and inter-quartile range is 4.49 
both of which indicate considerable variation in the measure. The value is statistically and 
economically significant (t-value of 7.73). In practical terms this means that a randomly 
chosen merger with combined pre-merger equity value of $500 million the target would gain 
on average $7.8 million more than the acquirer. Column ∆$CAR≤0 reports the proportion of 
mergers where the ∆$CAR is less than zero and thus the acquirer gains more than the target. 
In contrast to notion that targets always capture most of the gains, in 39% of all mergers the 
acquirers gain more. Figure 9 tells the same story graphically. 
The division of gains (∆$CAR) appears fairly similar across horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate mergers and the differences are statistically insignificant. However, between the 
backward and forward mergers there appears to be a noticeable difference. ∆$CAR is 
considerably larger in backward mergers than in forward mergers. This implies that target 
captures more of the common pie in backward mergers than in forward mergers. These 
findings are consistent with Ahern. However, unlike Ahern, I find this difference to be 
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statistically insignificant using Welch’s t-test for unequal variances31 with p-value of 0.13. I 
believe that the insignificance of the test statistic is due to the smaller sample size in my work. 
Assuming no change in the mean and standard deviation, the difference would be significant 
if the sample sizes were roughly twice the size of the ones used. 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics of the division of gains in mergers 
Panel A: Target gain relative to the acquirer gain (∆$CAR)                     
  
                  Percentile         
Sample µ   σ   Min Max   10th 25th 50th 75th 90th   ∆$CAR≤0   N 
  
                                    
All Mergers 1.56   5.71   -25.53 47.29   -3.33 -1.10 0.65 3.39 8.23   39.0 %   798 
  
Horizontal 1.66   5.51   -19.64 27.22   -2.99 -0.92 0.75 3.40 8.00   36.7 %   358 
  
Conglomerate 1.69   4.78   -5.95 26.76   -2.51 -1.14 0.37 3.48 5.88   41.9 %   92 
  
Vertical 1.42   6.13   -25.53 47.29   -3.89 -1.39 0.55 3.28 9.26   40.9 %   348 
  
  Backward 1.88   6.46   -8.69 47.29   -3.86 -1.10 0.37 2.99 9.93   39.2 %   139 
  
  Forward 1.10   5.58   -25.53 26.66   -3.70 -1.48 0.76 3.34 8.02   40.0 %   149 
  
  Indeterminate 1.17   6.68   -22.30 17.05   -6.37 -1.44 0.44 3.78 11.07   49.1 %   60 
Panel B: Target's percentage share of total gains when both companies have positive returns (%Ω)           
  
                  Percentile         
Sample µ   σ   Min Max   10th 25th 50th 75th 90th   Ω≤50%   N 
  
                                    
All Mergers 42.3 %   31.9 %   0.0 % 99.9 %   2.1 % 13.4 % 36.4 % 70.6 % 89.9 %   58.8 %   264 
  
Horizontal 45.7 %   31.9 %   0.0 % 99.9 %   1.3 % 18.3 % 39.7 % 72.3 % 93.2 %   55.0 %   117 
  
Conglomerate 38.7 %   32.0 %   1.0 % 99.1 %   2.1 % 12.6 % 28.5 % 63.5 % 93.0 %   62.8 %   29 
  
Vertical 39.9 %   31.9 %   0.0 % 99.9 %   2.0 % 11.5 % 33.8 % 70.7 % 85.3 %   62.1 %   118 
  
  Backward 42.8 %   29.6 %   0.4 % 99.9 %   6.3 % 16.2 % 40.6 % 68.5 % 86.0 %   58.1 %   42 
  
  Forward 40.9 %   33.1 %   0.0 % 98.1 %   1.0 % 11.6 % 33.8 % 77.7 % 86.9 %   60.0 %   52 
  
  Indefinite 32.8 %   33.2 %   0.1 % 99.9 %   0.9 % 6.2 % 19.3 % 61.3 % 92.5 %   72.0 %   24 
 
Ahern (2012) reports similar results in his study of 4102 mergers in the United States. He 
finds that in the US mergers targets gain on average 3.5 cents more than the acquirers per 
each dollar in combined pre-merger market equity. This is roughly twice more than my result. 
Furthermore, Ahern finds that in comparison to my finding of 39%, in 27% of the mergers 
acquirers capture larger share of the gains. In unreported t-test and χ2 test I find this difference 
                                                 
31
 F-test for unequal variances suggests that the variances are unequal. However, since the sample distribution is 
skewed and the F-test for equality of variance is known to be susceptible to violations of normality, I also tested 
the difference of means assuming equal variances. The results are qualitatively unchanged. 
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between our studies statistically significant. In combination these two differences suggest that 
in the US targets seem to be 
able to command greater 
bargaining power in 
negotiations. This notion is 
supported by greater 
observed the target CAR in 
Ahern’s study in comparison 
to mine: around 20% vs. 5% 
though I cannot for sure is 
this inter-study difference 
statistically significant.  
Panel B of Table 4 displays the summary statistics for the division of gains when both the 
target and acquirer have positive returns. In this context measuring the target’s share as a 
fraction of total gains is sensible and now the results are displayed as target’s fraction of total 
gains. The most interesting finding is that when both companies observe positive returns 
acquirers capture on average more of the value created in all merger types leaving the average 
target with only 42.3% of the 
gains. This finding is very 
much at odds with the notion 
that the target nearly always 
gains more than the acquirer. 
Column “Ω≤50%” indicates 
the fraction of mergers where 
the acquirer captures 50% or 
more of the gains. Acquirer 
gains more than 50% of the 
total gains in 58.8% of the 
mergers (Ω≤50%). These 
points are also demonstrated in Figure 8 which shows the distribution of target’s share of total 
$CAR. Large fraction of the transactions appear below the 50% fraction indicating that in 
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Figure 9: Histogram ∆$CAR of in all mergers 
Figure 8: Histogram of target’s share of gains when both companies have 
positive returns 
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most cases acquirer captures more than 50%. The distribution appears vaguely uniform with 
the exception of the first bin (<5%). The peak in the first bin means that in many deals the 
target captures less than 5% of the total gains. This is primarily driven by a considerable 
number of mergers where the target is small compared to the acquirer and their dollar gains 
are consequently small. For this reason it is very dangerous to compare division of gains using 
percentage returns. 
So far my results suggest that there are statistically significant differences between mergers 
and division of gains between the US and Europe suggesting that further research into the 
differences is warranted to establish do these differences withstand greater scrutiny. 
 EXTENT OF VERTICAL RELATIONS IN EUROPEAN MERGERS 5.2.2
Table 5 describes the statistical measures of customer-supplier relation variables for the 
vertical mergers subsample. In the backward mergers average customer/acquirer buys 6.4% of 
the supplier’s/target’s output (RBI). These purchases represent about 3.9% of the average 
customer’s/acquirer’s input costs (RSI). Both of these figures are very large and economically 
substantial. 
Contrast these finding with Ahern whose corresponding values are 4.3% (RBI) and 3.5% 
(RSI). While his RSI value is not significantly different from mine, in untabulated t-test I find 
that his RBI value is significantly lower than mine different at 5% significance value. 
Although this finding appears interesting I am rather skeptical whether this represents true 
difference between the US and European mergers. As I explained in before the sample suffers 
from unexpectedly large decay. It is possible that my sample is biased to favor large mergers 
over smaller ones. If companies that have above average RBI also tend to be larger, such as 
chemical and petroleum industries, then the average of my sample should also be higher, even 
if there is no difference between the true population means. 
In forward mergers the average customer/target buys 4.9% of the average supplier/acquirer’s 
output (RBI) and these purchases represent on average 3.9% of the average 
supplier/acquirer’s input costs (RSI). As with backward mergers, Ahern reports significantly 
lower value for RBI (2.48%). This difference is significant at 5% level. 
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Table 5: Summary statistics of the customer-supplier relations in vertical mergers 
Backward Mergers             Percentile (%)     
  µ (%)   σ (%)   
Min 
(%) 
Max 
(%)   10th 25th 50th 75th 90th   N 
RBI (%) 6.42   13.58   0.01 93.30   0.04 0.17 1.07 6.91 19.67   139 
RSI (%) 3.89   8.85   0.01 69.83   0.08 0.32 1.37 3.60 8.19   139 
RBI/RSI 2.81   6.05   0.01 44.36   0.18 0.34 1.00 2.13 6.48   139 
                              
Forward Mergers                           
RBI (%) 4.92   15.19   0.01 149.39   0.02 0.11 0.47 3.12 11.95   149 
RSI (%) 3.86   11.99   0.01 70.16   0.08 0.48 0.94 2.02 6.41   149 
RBI/RSI 2.46   7.07   0.01 51.14   0.09 0.25 0.752 1.62 4.25   149 
                              
Indefinite Vertical Mergers                       
RBI (%) 5.59   10.85   0.01 32.74   0.091 0.178 0.64 2.93 32.74   60 
RSI (%) 2.52   6.13   0.03 34.25   0.081 0.255 0.76 2.61 3.49   60 
RBI/RSI 2.97   4.53   0.04 27.00   0.10 0.47 1.01 3.23 9.38   60 
 
While the numbers presented above can appear small as such, it is important to keep in mind 
that these numbers reflect the share of costs among all factors of production along with 
employment costs and taxes. And consequently their actual share of raw material costs is 
therefore considerably higher than the reported figure. Fan and Goyal (2006) suggest that 1% 
RSI threshold is sufficient in identifying significant vertical relationship. Both RSI and RBI 
distributions are highly skewed to right as seen in the median values well below the average 
values. 
Unlike Ahern, I also calculated RBI and RSI for indefinite vertical mergers. The indefinite 
class is those mergers that are not horizontal mergers and have vertical relationship but the 
direction of the relationship cannot be deduced from the RBI and RSI values. In his study, 
Ahern simply dumped those mergers into residual category and did not analyze them. Casual 
observation of these mergers suggests that most of those companies are in the IT field, 
financial services or in oil and gas industries. While there might not be unambiguous 
customer-supplier relationship, it is certain that these companies do have significant trading 
relationship as suggested by comparing the values between different types of mergers. 
In addition to RBI and RSI I also calculated RBI/RSI ratio for each transaction. If vertical 
mergers were primarily driven by asymmetry in customer-supplier relations, we should see 
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corresponding patterns in RBI/RSI ratio. However, as is evident from the summary statistics, 
no such differences exist among different types of mergers and each merger has a very broad 
spread of the variable. 
 THE DETERMINANTS OF DIVISION OF GAINS 5.2.3
Table 6 and Table 7 report the results of the first regression run on RBI and RSI in explaining 
division of gains in backward and forward mergers. The sample is divided into two separate 
regressions because backward and forward mergers are expected to have opposite signs of the 
coefficients of RBI and RSI. The sample size is smaller than the reported in the previous 
tables due to data limitations, in particular missing concentration ratios and one or more of the 
variables needed to calculate the price cost margin. The dependent variable is ∆$CAR which 
is the target’s relative percentage gain to acquirer’s gain standardized by the joint market 
value of both companies 50 days prior the merger. 
The table’s first column indicates the expected sign of the independent variable’s coefficient; 
the second column is for the first regression that only includes the variables that reflect the 
firm scarcity. The second column adds some additional control variables such if the merger 
was international, logarithmic sizes of the companies and the acquirer’s relative size to target.  
Quality control measures undertaken are following. All the regression results are checked for 
heteroskedasticity and the significance tests are performed using heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. Initially I included fixed effects for target and acquirer industry, year and 
target and acquirer country. However, due to the small sample size I run out of degrees of 
freedom if all the fixed effects are included which is in total nearly 100 variables to be 
included. Partial inclusion of some fixed effects does not materially improve the model and 
are for this reason left out. 
5.2.3.1 BACKWARD MERGERS SAMPLE 
I will first present the results for backward mergers sample. As visible from Table 6 the 
expected signs of the coefficients for RBI and RSI are as expected. However, the actual 
coefficients are highly insignificant which is in contrast with Ahern (2012) who found 
statistically significant relation. From other variables, only the acquirer M/B ratio has 
statistically significant coefficient at the 5% significance level. Also the intercept of the first 
regression was significant at 10% significance level. This would suggest that to some extent 
the division of gains by default is not equal. 
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Table 6: Target's gain relative to acquirer gain in backward vertical merger 
Backward mergers   Regression 
Variable Expected sign 1   2 
          
Intercept N/A 4.574*   12.283 
    [0.089]   [0.135] 
RSI + 0.024   0.08 
    [0.813]   [0.936] 
RBI - -0.035   -0.024 
    [0.51]   [0.68] 
Acquirer M/B ? 0.051**   0.055** 
    [0.032]   [0.026] 
Target M/B ? -0.052   -0.035 
    [0.723]   [0.817] 
Acquirer price-cost margin - -0.008   -0.007 
    [0.179]   [0.249] 
Target price-cost margin + 0.000   0.000 
    [0.748]   [0.572] 
Acquirer industry profit - -0.56   -0.061 
    [0.457]   [0.437] 
Target industry profit + -0.17   -0.014 
    [0.772]   [0.822] 
Acquirer industry concentration - -0.001   0 
    [0.972]   [0.993] 
Target industry concentration + -0.023   -0.018 
    [0.58]   [0.679] 
International merger ? N/A   -0.853 
        [0.617] 
Relative size of merger + N/A   0.041 
        
[0.633] 
Natural logarithm of acquirer market equity - N/A   -0.318 
        [0.360] 
Natural logarithm of target market equity + N/A   -0.052 
        [0.917] 
          
Acquirer industry fixed effects   No   No 
Target industry fixed effects   No   No 
Acquirer nation fixed effect   No   No 
Target nation fixed effects   No   No 
Year fixed effects   No   No 
          
R2   0.1   0.128 
Adjusted R2   -0.007   -0.025 
Number of observations   93   93 
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Ahern also reported significant coefficients for acquirer’s and target’s price-cost margins. I 
fail to find significant or even near significant relationship for these variables. While I suspect 
that the small sample size is to blame for most of the differences between my and Ahern’s 
studies, I cannot entirely rule out the possibility that using the US concentration ratios in place 
of European concentration ratios is not necessary a very good proxy despite the previous 
literature suggesting otherwise. 
5.2.3.2 FORWARD MERGERS SAMPLE 
Table 7 presents the regression results in the forward mergers subsample. As is the case with 
the backward sample, none of the variables describing product market relationship (RBI and 
RSI) are statistically significant. The coefficients of the variables of interest have the expected 
signs and their magnitude is in the same ballpark with Ahern’s findings. However, despite the 
coefficients lacking statistical significance, they have much lower p-values than in the 
backwards merger sample. Ahern found similar trend in his study where coefficients for RBI 
and RSI in forward mergers sample were statistically significant and stronger than in 
backward mergers where they were statistically insignificant. This could imply that my 
sample size is too small to give statistical significance to my findings. 
From other variables in the forward merger sample, the only statistically significant variable 
is the target’s M/B ratio which is significant at even at 0.5% and 1% significance level. This 
is inconsistent with Ahern who failed to find any relationship with target’s M/B and division 
of gains. However, he did find coefficient for acquirer’s M/B statistically very significant. It 
is not immediately clear what could be the reason for this difference between our studies. 
Ahern also find acquirer industry concentration and acquirer industry profitability significant 
both of which I failed to find significant. 
If the RSI and RBI coefficients had been significant, the result would be economically very 
significant. One standard deviation increase in RSI in forward mergers would mean 6.5%-
point decrease in target’s share of gains. This is not a trivial amount, however, one should 
bear in mind that 90% of the forward mergers the target has RSI lower than 6.41% which 
limits the applicability of this result in the real world. 
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Table 7: Target's gain relative to acquirer's gain in forward vertical mergers 
Forward mergers   Regression 
Variable Expected sign 1   2 
          
Intercept N/A 3.289   -6.813 
    [0.279]   [0.46] 
RSI - -0.561   -0.557 
    [0.296]   [0.301] 
RBI + 0.114   0.08 
    [0.554]   [0.688] 
Acquirer M/B ? 0.004   0.004 
    [0.467]   [0.527] 
Target M/B ? -0.499***   -0.468*** 
    [0.004]   [0.006] 
Acquirer price-cost margin - 0.000   0.000 
    [0.974]   [0.973] 
Target price-cost margin + 0.000   0.000 
    [0.869]   [0.833] 
Acquirer industry profit - -0.012   0.016 
    [0.837]   [0.792] 
Target industry profit + -0.92   -0.08 
    [0.284]   [0.364] 
Acquirer industry concentration - -0.006   -0.007 
    [0.868]   [0.857] 
Target industry concentration + 0.05   0.036 
    [0.284]   [0.485] 
International merger ? N/A   1.055 
        [0.578] 
Relative size of merger + N/A   0.036 
        
[0.12] 
Natural logarithm of acquirer market equity - N/A   -0.104 
        [0.809] 
Natural logarithm of target market equity + N/A   0.58 
        [0.156] 
          
Acquirer industry fixed effects   No   No 
Target industry fixed effects   No   No 
Acquirer nation fixed effect   No   No 
Target nation fixed effects   No   No 
Year fixed effects   No   No 
          
R2   0.195   0.287 
Adjusted R2   0.069   0.106 
Number of observations   105   105 
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5.2.3.3 SUMMARY OF THE FIRST REGRESSIONS 
These first two set of tests do not provide strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that the 
product market relationships affect bargaining outcomes. Only evidence in support for the 
idea is that the signs of the coefficients of the variables of interest are as expected. Also 
differences in the significance of the coefficients between the two regressions which mirror 
the results of Ahern suggest that too small sample size could explain why results are not 
statistically significant. Although the results are not particularly encouraging presence of 
omitted variables such as agency motives or hubris could affect the results. Next I present the 
results of regressions run on the subsample where both the target and the acquirer have 
positive returns which should alleviate the concerns of unobserved agency issues. 
 THE DIVISION OF GAINS WHEN BOTH COMPANIES HAVE POSITIVE RESULTS 5.2.4
The dependent variable (∆$CAR) used in previous regressions is not intuitively 
understandable as a measure of division of gains. A much more intuitive approach is to think 
of the total gains as a pie to be split between the two parties but this line of thinking works 
only when both companies have positive returns. In this subsample that is exactly the case and 
I use target’s share of the total gains (Ω%) as dependent variable for the regressions. 
Assuming rational and efficient markets, mergers with positive returns to both companies are 
less likely to be motivated by agency motives than mergers where either party has negative 
returns. Presence of agency motive would constitute omitted variable bias which would bias 
the estimates for the coefficients. However, despite these benefits the procedure can 
potentially introduce sampling bias which means that the standard OLS coefficient estimates 
could be biased. This issue is addressed explicitly in Section 5.2.4.3. 
5.2.4.1 BACKWARD MERGERS WITH JOINTLY POSITIVE RETURNS SUBSAMPLE 
Table 8 presents the results for the regression for positive returns subsample in backward 
mergers. For making it possible to compare coefficients between the main sample and 
positive returns subsample I also run the regression using ∆$CAR as dependent variable. 
Results of both regressions are presented side-by-side. Like Ahern I do not find RSI or RBI 
statistically significant in case of backward mergers when using target’s share of gains as the 
dependent variable. Curiously the signs of the coefficients are as expected but that could have 
easily arisen by chance. Of the control variables only the logarithmic size of the acquirer is 
significant. 
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The case with ∆$CAR is more interesting. As was the case with the backward mergers main 
sample, neither RSI nor RBI is statistically significant although the p-values have improved. 
Only statistically significant variables were target industry profitability, acquirer price cost 
margin and the logarithmic size of the acquirer’s market equity. The significance of these 
variables can be explained in the following ways. The greater the target industry’s profit 
margin, the greater is the target’s share. This is consistent with the notion that industries with 
barriers to entry incentivize the acquirers to enter the industry via merger rather than by 
starting up a company. This gives the targets leverage in the merger negotiations and 
improves their bargaining outcomes. Greater acquirer price cost margin reflects the scarcity of 
the acquirer’s assets. The higher the price cost margin the scarcer the assets be they 
knowhow, brand or efficiency and this scarcity gives bargaining power to the acquirer. 
Explaining the acquirer size coefficient is more difficult. It appears that greater the acquirer, 
the less the target benefits. Size difference does not seem to explain this as the coefficient for 
the relative size is insignificant and small. In other words greater size of acquirer seems to 
benefit the acquirer irrespective of the size difference but whether this actually happening or 
arises because of the way regression equation is specified, I cannot say.  
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Table 8: Target's gain in the backward mergers subsample where both companies have positive returns 
Backward mergers   Regression 
Variable 
Expected 
sign Fraction 1 (Ω) Fraction 2 (Ω)   ∆$CAR (1) ∆$CAR (2) 
              
Intercept N/A 48.825 134.033   1.172 40.195*** 
    [0.000] t=6.817 [0.108]   [0.523] [0.003] 
RSI + 0.252 0.199   0.073 0.070 
    [0.628] [0.733]   [0.512] [0.415] 
RBI - -0.606 -0.229   -0.108 -0.104 
    [0.215] [0.697]   [0.302] [0.241] 
Acquirer M/B ? 1.109 0.421   0.080 -0.341 
    [0.351] [0.786]   [0.709] [0.147] 
Target M/B ? -1.009 -0.806   -0.171 0.303 
    [1.589] [0.698]   [0.560] [0.325] 
Acquirer price-cost margin - N/A -0.410   N/A -0.158** 
      [0.410]     [0.041] 
Target price-cost margin + N/A 0.000   N/A 0.000 
      [0.968]     [0.373] 
Acquirer industry profit - N/A -0.960   N/A -0.216 
      [0.291]     [0.113] 
Target industry profit + N/A 0.980   N/A 0.262** 
      [0.202]     [0.028] 
Acquirer industry concentration - N/A 0.046   N/A -0.107 
      [0.923]     [0.138] 
Target industry concentration + N/A -0.269   N/A -0.038 
      [0.443]     [0.461] 
International merger ? N/A -4.872   N/A -2.042 
      [0.723]     [0.317] 
Relative size of merger + N/A 0.161   N/A 0.053 
      
[0.447]   
  
[0.638] 
Natural logarithm of acquirer market equity - N/A -11.588**   N/A -2.071*** 
      [0.025]     [0.008] 
Natural logarithm of target market equity + N/A 8.670   N/A 0.592 
      [0.126]     [0.459] 
              
Acquirer industry fixed effects   No No   No No 
Target industry fixed effects   No No   No No 
Acquirer nation fixed effect   No No   No No 
Target nation fixed effects   No No   No No 
Year fixed effects   No No   No No 
              
R2   0.102 0.579   0.120 0.734 
Adjusted R2   -0.054 0.187   -0.033 0.487 
Number of observations   42 31   42 31 
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5.2.4.2 FORWARD MERGERS WITH JOINTLY POSITIVE RETURNS SUBSAMPLE 
Table 9 presents the regression results for positive returns subsample in forward mergers. 
What is interesting with the results is that the first time one of the product relationship 
variables is statistically significant. In the first and more limited regression RBI is statistically 
significant at 5% significance level and furthermore, the coefficient is also economically 
significant suggesting that 1% increase in RBI translates into almost 1.8%-point increase in 
acquirer’s share of the joint gains. Or put in a slightly different way, one standard deviation 
increase in RBI means almost 27%-point increase in the acquirer’s share. Of course this 
extrapolation is overt simplification but it serves to highlight the economics magnitude of the 
result. Despite the statistical significance it is worthwhile to point out that the significance of 
the result disappears (although the RBI coefficient is virtually unchanged) when additional 
variables are introduced to the regression undermining the credibility of the finding. The p-
value is also just barely below the 5% rejection threshold so it is not implausible that the 
result arises by to random chance. Like in the general sample, the significance of the 
regression coefficients appears to be bigger in forward mergers than in the backward mergers 
which is consistent with Ahern. 
Although the RBI is significant, the same cannot be said about RSI which in this first 
regression has unexpected coefficient. In the more extensive follow-up regression the sign 
corrects itself but the coefficients remain statistically insignificant. None of the control 
variables are significant at 5% level. Regressions run using ∆$CAR as dependent variable fail 
to have significant results either with the exception of target M/B ratio which contrary to  
signaling scarcity and thus increased bargaining power seems to reduce target’s share. 
However, like mentioned previously, M/B has multiple interpretations and thus it is not very 
surprising to see unexpected sign for the coefficient. 
In his study Ahern finds that RSI and RBI are indeed statistically and economically 
significant in forward mergers. However, Ahern’s sample size for this subsample is 
considerably bigger than mine which could explain why I fail to find similar results.  
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Table 9: Target's gain in the forward mergers subsample where both companies have positive returns 
Forward mergers   Regression 
Variable Expected sign Fraction 1 (Ω) Fraction 2 (Ω)   ∆$CAR (1) ∆$CAR (2) 
              
Intercept N/A 34.086*** 61.07   1.477 -11.021 
    [0.001] [0.436]   [0.246] [0.382] 
RSI - 1.109 -1.346   -0.390 -1.580 
    [0.796] [0.523]   [0.523] [0.175] 
RBI + 1.766** 1.499   0.169 0.151* 
    [0.049] [0.164]   [0.174] [0.09] 
Acquirer M/B ? 0.086 0.119   -0.008 -0.006 
    [0.282] [0.221]   [0.472] [0.647] 
Target M/B ? -0.707 -0.314   -0.756*** -0.631*** 
    [0.480] [0.809]   [0.000] t=-5.407 [0.004] 
Acquirer price-cost margin - N/A 0.033   N/A -0.001 
      [0.674]     [0.897] 
Target price-cost margin + N/A -0.011   N/A 0.000 
      [0.266]     [0.988] 
Acquirer industry profit - N/A -0.082   N/A 0.094 
      [0.902]     [0.323] 
Target industry profit + N/A -0.882   N/A -0.152 
      [0.324]     [0.231] 
Acquirer industry concentration - N/A -0.145   N/A 0.050 
      [0.689]     [0.317] 
Target industry concentration + N/A 0.071   N/A 0.107 
      [0.894]     [0.172] 
International merger ? N/A -3.688   N/A 0.041 
      [0.833]     [0.987] 
Relative size of merger + N/A 0.159   N/A 0.034 
      
[0.732]   
  
[0.531] 
Natural logarithm of acquirer market equity - N/A -6.202   N/A -0.458 
      [0.146]     [0.440] 
Natural logarithm of target market equity + N/A 5.963*   N/A 0.509 
      [0.064]     [0.251] 
              
Acquirer industry fixed effects   No No   No No 
Target industry fixed effects   No No   No No 
Acquirer nation fixed effect   No No   No No 
Target nation fixed effects   No No   No No 
Year fixed effects   No No   No No 
              
R2   0.291 0.563   0.574 0.734 
Adjusted R2   0.177 0.155   0.506 0.485 
Number of observations   52 39   52 39 
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5.2.4.3 POTENTIAL SELECTION BIAS AND ADDRESSING IT 
As implied before, choosing only mergers where both parties experience positive returns may 
cause standard OLS regression estimates to be biased. Luckily, there is a way to estimate if 
the bias is significant and then correct for it using Heckman (1979) two-stage selection 
models if the normality assumption can be satisfied. In practice it is to implement and has 
strong basis in statistical theory. The following description of the method is largely from 
Ahern. 
The correction is implemented by first running a probit regression that estimates the 
probability of being included in the positive returns subsample conditional being backward or 
forward merger. Fitted values of the first stage estimation are transformed into inverse Mills 
ratio variable, λ, which is included in the second-stage estimation to control for the 
probability of entering the sample. To identify the selection effect in the second-stage 
regression there must be a set of excluded variables in the first-stage which explain variation 
in the probability that both the target and the acquirer have positive returns while not affecting 
the coefficients of interest through their absence in the second-stage. Ahern uses form of 
payment, target defenses, relative value and firm sizes to estimate the probability of being 
included in the sample and these variables are consequently dropped in the second stage. 
As I did not find significant results that should be tested for robustness, I do not perform the 
Heckman correction as it would be unlikely to improve the results. However, I do recognize 
that should my study be replicated with a larger sample, the self-selection bias discussed in 
this subsection should be addressed, especially if significant results are found in the OLS 
regression. 
5.3 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this study I find no conclusive evidence that vertical relations affect division of gains 
between targets and acquirers. However, there are some clues of which implications are 
consistent with Ahern’s findings suggesting that a revision of this study with larger and better 
quality sample in the future might be worthwhile. Although most results are not statistically 
significant coefficients for forward mergers have higher statistical significance than those for 
backward mergers. This is in line with Ahern who finds no significant relationship between 
product market relations and division of gains in backward mergers but finds relationship in 
forward mergers. This result is not predicted by transaction cost economics (Section 2.2.2.2.1) 
in which the ultimate owner is irrelevant or by any theoretical models of vertical integration 
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based on acquisition of market power (Section 2.2.1.1.2). The property rights theory predicts 
which party should be the acquirer but it does not make the prediction on the intensity of 
product market relationships. Furthermore, it does not explain why those relations should 
matter only in forward mergers. That question is left for future research. 
An interesting extension to my study would be to investigate if the relations are changed if we 
impose minimum values for the RSI and RBI. In this study no such limitations were imposed 
as long as the direction of the merger could be ambiguously determined from the relative 
values of RSI and RBI. Setting a minimum value might select mergers that where the vertical 
relationship is more important in the motivation for the merger. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis I empirically investigate the impact of industrial level product market relations 
to bargaining outcomes in vertical merger negotiations following the example of Ahern 
(2012). Unlike Ahern, who conducted his study in the United States, I focus on the European 
mergers. 
The research problem is addressed by identifying vertical mergers using Input-Output tables 
and calculating relative buyer importance (RBI) and relative supplier importance (RSI) scores 
which also proxy the supplier’s dependence on the buyer and buyer’s dependence on the 
supplier as measured by the industry level trade between the industries of the merging 
companies. Bargaining outcomes are measured by comparing the difference in cumulative 
abnormal dollar returns of the merging companies standardized by the company size and they 
are used as the dependent variable in an OLS regression in which RBI and RSI are used as the 
main variables of interest to explain the variation in bargaining outcomes. In process of 
identifying backward and forward mergers, as a byproduct, I also identify horizontal and 
conglomerate mergers and provide a new insight into the fraction of different types of 
mergers in the Western Europe in the past 20 years. 
Contrary to previous literature my study fails to find solid evidence in support of the notion 
that product market relations affect division of merger gains. However, as my sample size is 
considerably smaller than used in studies before there is plausible chance that failure to find 
significant results is due to sample size. The fact that significance of my coefficients are 
higher in same subsamples where previous studies find significant results corroborates with 
this idea. Furthermore, I find that the common notion that target nearly always captures lion’s 
share of the common gains is false. In approximately 40% of the mergers the acquirers 
capture greater share of the dollar gains and in a subsample where both companies have 
positive returns this figure is 60%. Finally my work on the classification of the sample 
mergers shows that vertical mergers are more common than previously anticipated 
constituting about 40% of all the mergers. Conglomerate mergers are consequently rarer as 
merger classification on SIC/NAICS falsely classifies some of the vertical mergers as 
conglomerate mergers.  
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7 APPENDICES 
This section contains the Appendices. 
7.1 APPENDIX A – SAMPLE DECAY 
During this study I encountered an unexpected problem: despite my best efforts to beforehand 
estimate data availability in assessing the feasibility of this study in the end I was not able to 
get all the data I wanted as would have sunk my sample even below theoretical minimum for 
regression analysis. The sample size is in my view too low to draw strong conclusions from 
the results but as the true state of affairs was revealed only after too much effort was already 
invested into the study I decided to carry on with it anyway. After all, the goal of a Master’s 
Thesis is to demonstrate the understanding and use of scientific methods and reporting rather 
than producing new knowledge. 
Initial restrictions on my sample yielded 4724 observations from SDC for year 1984 onwards. 
After applying time restrictions (i.e. excluding deals prior 1.1.1990), checking that the names 
match and availability of market data that number shrunk to 3549 observations. At this point I 
estimated that after all unforeseen reductions my data sample would be no less than 3000 
observations. As it turned out, this estimate turned out to be wrong by large margin. In the end 
I would have only about 800 observations for my final sample. 
As I was warned beforehand about availability of market data, I focused my assessment of the 
potential sample size based on the number of daily returns available. Since retrieving all the 
necessary data on all data variables would have required considerable time, I retrieved only 
the most scarce data classes for inspection. In practice this meant that I downloaded the daily 
returns for the event day for all companies and assumed that if that data was present then all 
other market data and accounting information would be available too. This turned out to be a 
very wrong assumption as initially I did not properly check for the data quality. 
When I actually downloaded all the data and started processing it, I had to discard far more 
observations than I had anticipated. The biggest reason was that a large number of the cells 
had no data recorded in them but the program returned series of zeros in them rather than 
leaving the cell blank or giving an error message. When I was initially checking for the data 
availability I counted the number of valid observations using “=count” function in Excel 
which counts the number of cells with have a numeric value in them. For this reason Excel 
had also counted observations with value zero while in reality those should not have been 
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counted. To make things worse, also a number of companies were missing either market value 
data (even if the event window returns were available correctly) or one of the accounting 
values used to count some of the control variables. Finally, combination of different data 
bases then further reduced some observations as market concentration data was not available 
for all industries. 
While I had taken into consideration that for a valid observation daily returns are required for 
both the acquirer and target, I had not checked the availability of all 15 other variables that 
were required for the study. A missing value even in one of the variables would mean that the 
entire observation had to be discarded in the regression phase. This turned out to be 
particularly crucial as many of the discarded observations had only one or two missing in one 
of the non-market raw variables (e.g. sales or book value of equity). As a result I ended up 
with only a quarter of the observations that I had anticipated at the beginning of the study. 
7.2 APPENDIX B – MORE INFORMATION ON MAKE AND USE TABLES 
The Make table has three relevant columns: the first one indicates the producing industry and 
it is identified by a unique 6-digit I/O industry code, the next column identifies a commodity 
that the industry indicated in the first column is producing. Analogously the commodity is 
identified by a 6-digit I/O commodity code. The last column indicates the monetary value of 
the commodity produced by the industry indicated in the first column. This is effectively the 
amount of money that the producer receives for selling the output. It is important to realize 
that any industry can produce more than one type of commodity, for example “cement 
manufacturing” industry produces not only cement but among other things also “stone mining 
and quarry products”, “lime and gypsum products” and “sand, gravel, clay, and ceramic and 
refractory minerals”. 
The Use table on the other hand lists where the goods produced in the Make table are going. 
Besides the commodity codes listed in the Make table, the Use table has provisionary codes 
for imports and exports, scrap and second hand goods and three special accounting 
provisions, namely employee compensation, taxes and gross margin. The structure of the Use 
table is somewhat different from the Make table. The first column indicates the commodity or 
item that is being used by the industry in indicated in the second column. The third column 
shows the monetary value of the use of that good or item from the producer’s perspective – 
not the user’s. In other words the value indicated in the third column is what the producer was 
paid for it – not what the user paid for it. The following columns indicate all sorts of other 
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costs that the purchaser had to pay to get the commodity to its premises. These costs include 
various transportation costs and sales margins taken by middlemen. The last column is the 
sum of the producer price and all the intermediate costs and indicates the value that the user 
paid for the commodity in total. 
7.3 APPENDIX C – LIST OF STOCK MARKET INDICES USED IN ESTIMATION OF 
THE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF NORMAL RETURNS 
In this appendix are listed all the benchmark indices that were used in estimation of the 
normal returns coefficients and the normal returns. As a general rule, the main overall stock 
market index from each country was included if it was available in Thomson DataStream. If 
that was not possible then an alternative index was used provided that in the description of the 
index it was stated that t it seeks to track overall market movements within its country. For the 
names of the indices, see the table below. Note that there is no index for Luxembourg because 
the final sample does not contain any observations from there. 
Table 10: List of indexes used in assessing the normal returns 
Country Name of the Index 
Austria ATX (Austrian Traded Index) 
Belgium Belgium 20 
Denmark OMX Copenhagen 
Finland OMX Helsinki 
France SBF 120 
Germany MDAX Frankfurt 
Greece Athex Composite 
Ireland 
Ireland Stock Exchange Overall 
(ISEQ) 
Italy FTSE Italy 
Netherlands AEX All Share 
Norway Oslo Exchange All Share 
Portugal Portugal PSI General 
Spain 
Madrid Stock Exchange General 
(IGBM) 
Sweden OMX Stockholm 
Switzerland Swiss Market (SMI) 
United Kingdom FTSE All Share 
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7.4 APPENDIX D – EQUATIONS USED IN THE SIGNIFICANCE TESTING 
 
t-test for significance for one day abnormal returns 
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